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Policing, Crime and Legitimacy in New York and Los Angeles: 
The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic Crime Declines 
 
Jeffrey Fagan∗   John MacDonald+ 
Columbia University  University of Pennsylvania 
 
  
The relationship between citizens and police occupies a central place both 
in urban politics and in the political economy of cities. In this respect, for nearly 
50 years, New York and Los Angeles have been bellwethers for many of the 
nation’s larger cities.   In each city, as in cities across the world, citizens look to 
police to protect them from crime, maintain social order, respond to a variety of 
extra-legal community concerns, and reinforce the moral order of the law by 
apprehending offenders and helping bring them to justice (Reiss, 1971; Black, 
1980; Skogan and Frydl, 2004).  Beyond enforcing social and political order, the 
police are the front line representatives of a variety of social service needs in 
communities (Walker, 1992).  Accordingly, policing is an amenity of urban places 
that shapes how citizens regard their neighborhood and their city, and in turn, the 
extent to which citizens see their local institutions as responsive and reliable 
(Skogan, 2006).  Effective and sustainable governance, especially when it comes 
to public safety, depends on the capacity of the institutions of criminal justice to 
provide “value” that leverages legitimacy and cooperation among its citizens 
(Moore et al., 2002; Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Tyler, 
2010). 
 
How the police exercise their legal authority is an aspect to policing that is 
particularly salient in larger urban areas and often competes with performance-
based evaluations of police.  How the police exercise their legal authority has 
fundamental implications for public sentiments about the quality of police 
services and trust in political institutions more generally (Moore et al., 2002; 
Tyler and Fagan, 2008).  There is an expressive function in the way that police 
exercise their authority that signals their regard for the dignity and rights of 
citizens (Smith, 2008).  These signs of respect leverage the cooperation of citizens 
with police, and engage citizens as partners in the co-production of security 
(Fagan and Meares, 2008).  When these expressions are absent, though, trouble 
follows when citizens depend on the police for their safety and at the same time 
harbor resentments over their omnipresence in their lives. 
 
  For nearly five decades, tension between citizens and police in Los 
Angeles (LA) and New York (NYC) have pervaded relations and fouled the 	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polity.  Throughout this time, the institutions of policing occupied a special place 
in the political and social cultures of each city, for at least four reasons.  First, LA 
and NYC each suffered a crime epidemic from the late 1960s to the early 1990s 
that is visible in each city’s homicide and robbery trends.  We discuss these trends 
later in this chapter.  These epidemics placed unprecedented demands on the 
police and each city’s political institutions, and created recurring conflicts 
between police and the most crime-ridden and heavily policed minority 
communities.  The mix of crime, race and policing placed intense political 
pressures on the police.1   
 
Next, a series of police scandals and crises focused unwelcome attention 
on the police, threatening to undermine their perceived legitimacy and corrode 
citizen confidence in the police as effective agents of crime control.  Third, the 
scandals of the police were also confounded with racial politics of cities, as a 
number of high profile police-abuse of force cases deepened historical minority 
distrust of the police in both LA and New York.  Both the scandals and patterns of 
civil rights violations by their police landed each city in federal court and resulted 
in legal interventions that attempted – and we show later, largely failed – to 
reshape the institutions of policing.   
 
Fourth, in response more to different forms of corruption scandals than 
racial upheavals or conflicts, police in both LA and NYC both underwent 
significant institutional transformations in their policing architectures.  The 
tipping point in this transformation in each city was the intervention and 
administrative reforms brought about by (twice) former commissioner William J. 
Bratton.  At the outset, these reforms fundamentally changed the strategies and 
tactics of policing.  In both cities crime rates dropped significantly after these 
reforms, lending credence to the argument that the police have a material impact 
in influencing crime rates (Kelling and Cole, 1996; Bratton and Kelling, 1998).  
 
These seeming “victories” over crime changed the discourse on the 
politics of the police in LA and NYC from one of scandal and reforms to control 
corruption to managing the conflicts between aggressive police tactics and 
disparities in their application towards minorities (Alpert et al., 2006; Ayres and 
Borowsky, 2008; Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss, 2007; Ridgeway, 2007; Fagan et al., 
2010).  Nevertheless, policing in each city in the last decade was colored and 
shadowed by the attention of the federal courts who responded to investigate, 
assess, and monitor both police agencies response to controlling crime and 
maintaining civil rights.2 Beyond the acute periods of crime decline, as each city 
transitioned to a low(er) crime era, the two cities took sharply divergent paths 
both in police-citizen relations and policing tactics.  Litigation bore very different 
kinds of fruit in each city, and the current atmosphere in the two cities reflects 
sharply divergent institutional postures toward crime and community (Compare 
Stone et al.’s 2009 report on LA to Fagan et al. 2010’s report on NYC).  Those 
divergent paths form the core of this chapter, and forecast very different futures 
for policing in the two cities.  
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This Chapter 
 
In this chapter, we tell the story of policing, crime and the search for 
legitimacy over the past two decades in LA and NYC.  Throughout this complex 
political, normative and legal landscape, crime rates dropped dramatically in each 
city to levels not seen the early 1960s.  Accordingly, a full understanding of the 
natural history of crime and policing in each city has to start at a much earlier 
point in time, for two reasons.  First, criminologists tend to forget history, 
especially history that predates the sharp rise in crime that began in the U.S. in the 
mid-1960s, and the nationwide decline starting in 1993.  There is a tendency in 
the criminology literature to decouple periods of rising crime from periods of 
falling crime, without viewing the two movements as a single social and historical 
context. 3   
 
So, to understand the present, we look to the period before the crime rates 
began a steep rise in each place, at the moment when the smoldering tensions 
between citizens – especially racial and ethnic minorities – and the police 
exploded into open conflict.  One part of this chapter, then, is a modest effort to 
construct a “history of the present” to explain how two cities took different but 
intertwined paths from low to high crime and back again.4 
 
Second, crime itself has undergone historic transformations, both in its 
substance and its trends.  While crime in each city has shown patterns typical of 
recurring and closely spaced epidemics, the longer view shows that its rise and 
fall over five decades seems to reflect an historic step and transformation that 
itself may have defied the best efforts of police, police reformers, courts to effect 
short-term change.  Rather, the trends over a longer interval seem to point to 
profound political, economic, and structural transformations in the two cities into 
eras of relative safety and calm.  The chapter itself illustrates the tension between 
historic shifts and the situational, and the importance of having a zoom lens to 
detect both the micro-landscape of small steps within a larger historical process, 
as well as the larger social and political ecology of changing cities.   
 
In the chapter, then, we move back and forth between the shorter lens of 
interactions between citizens and police, to the longer focus of crime trends over 
time and the political economy of the two cities.  An exclusively narrow focus on 
social exchanges and interactions between citizens and police would complicate 
efforts to find connections between cities as historically and socially distant as 
NY and LA may seem.  But from the broader perspective of police as part of the 
urban social fabric of cities, we identify several threads that connect the past and 
future of policing in the nation’s two largest cities.  These threads are far more 
complex and work at a larger scale than the everyday drama of crime and justice.  
The factors that shape large shifts in crime must be seen as working on a scale 
that is comparable to these shifts.  How these factors have developed in this 
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decade will give us a window through which to envision crime and justice in the 
decade to come. 
 
The chapter tells this story in four sections.  We begin with a discussion of 
the evolution of policing in the two cities, assessing reciprocal and dynamic 
changes that reflected both the crises of crime epidemics and crises within the 
police.  Next, we examine the role of litigation on the evolution of policing.  
Policing regimes in each city were challenged in federal courts, as well as by 
elected officials in local investigations.  The outcomes of litigation in the two 
cities were starkly different, a reflection in part of the structure of the litigation 
itself as well as the posture of each city toward the links between scandal and 
reform.  While Los Angeles linked a major policing scandal with reform, the 
NYPD compartmentalized the origins of its scandal to specific forms of police 
corruption and use of force, while ignoring the need to regulate the constitutional 
parameters of routine police-citizen interactions.  The legacies of litigation in each 
city are quite different, with important lessons for the future.   
 
Third, we examine the historic transformations in crime itself.  
Criminologists, as we noted, tend to take a shorter view of crime trends that 
expand for one or perhaps two decades.  Shorter-term crime trends are important 
in their social, political and personal consequences.  But short-term boom-or-bust 
explanations provide limited perspective for the longer historical trends that we 
observe for each of the two cities.  Crime rates today in both New York and Los 
Angeles have returned to the same levels as 50 years ago, before the upheavals in 
policing in the midst of that cycle, eras that spanned significant changes in the 
social and political order of the cities.  By stepping back, we show that what may 
be meaningful and consequential in the short-term may be less important when 
contextualized from longer and larger historical processes. 
 
In the fourth section, we broaden our focus to examine basic changes in 
the structures of the cities, looking closely at factors that were implicated in the 
boom-and-bust cycles of crime that characterize the past half century.  We locate 
crime trends in these larger structural transformations of the cities, and 
contextualize policing in what seems to be an historic and evolutionary cycle.  We 
conclude with a brief look at the past and the future.  We envision, at least for the 
near future, very different paths in the evolution of policing in LA and NYC and 
its place in these transformed cities. 
 
 
Policing in the City 
 
We begin the story of the rise and fall of crime in LA and NYC by 
focusing on the police.  There are several reasons to start here, and postpone a 
discussion of the larger social structural and ecological changes that were taking 
place at the same time in each city.  The most salient is both the recurring political 
and social science attention to the relationship between police and crime, which 
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we visit in a later section.  A second is the sheer magnetism of the policing story 
in each city that leads us to start at what we see as its modern origins.  We begin 
with an overview of the historical arc that frames the institutional reforms in 
policing in this modern era.  We begin with the riots of the 1960s and their legacy.  
We then move to the institutional dynamics of police tensions and reforms, and 
into the modern era of the “new policing” in each city. 
 
The Legacies of the Riots 
 
 The scars of riots in NYC and LA, events that took place nearly 50 years 
ago, were part of the historical process that shook the police departments in each 
city, and perhaps intensified the 50 year cycle of crime and its decline that 
followed.  
 
 By 1967, riots erupted in more than 250 both large and small cities across 
the country (Kerner Commission Report, 1968).  The 1965 Watts riot in LA 
received closer scholarly and popular attention than the riots in Harlem in NYC a 
year earlier (Cohen and Murphy, 1966; Perlestein, 2008).  Nevertheless, the two 
events had much in common.  In each case, tensions between Black citizens and 
police became the flashpoint that ignited sustained violence and property damage.  
In each case, also, the riots marked the opening of a breach of trust between 
minority citizens and the police that lasted for decades.   
 
 Harlem, in northern Manhattan, was the scene of one of the nation’s first 
riots.  The riot erupted in July, 1964, when police shot and killed a 15 year old 
African American teenager following a dispute with a local White building 
superintendent.  When a police officer intervened, the teenager attacked him with 
a knife and was shot by the officer.  Riots followed shortly in neighborhoods 
across the city, often as a sequence of events beginning with protest marches that 
ignited into violence when police attempted to control the marches (Walker, 
2012). 
 
Within days, the Harlem riots spread across to other cities the country, 
including several cities with multiple episodes of riots.  More than 325 riots in 
257 cities broke out between 1964 and 1968 (Eisenhower Commission, 1969). 
There were 150 riots in 1967 alone (Kerner Commission, 1968).  Even cities 
where police believed they had good relationships with the minority community 
were susceptible to race riots, demonstrating that police departments may not 
have had a clear picture of how they were perceived in these communities.   
 
For police in NYC, the Harlem riots were a turning point not only in their 
relationships to the minority communities, but in the stance of the city and its 
political leadership toward crime and the underlying social conditions.  While the 
U.S. Supreme Court had, at the outset of the 1960s sought to curb the police 
tactics that led to many of the riots, the Harlem riots exposed fractures in the 
Court’s dual campaign of improving police procedure and supporting civil rights 
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in the 1960s (Stuntz, 2010).  The election of liberal mayor John Lindsay in 1965 
represented the face of social reform in response to the riots, while the battle over 
civilian oversight of the police brought forward a quite different face that sought 
deregulation of the police and a pullback from the procedural reforms earlier in 
the decade (Perlestein, 2008). 
 
The spark for the 1965 riots in the Watts section of LA illustrates this 
triggering mechanism. Marquette Frye, a 21 year old African-American was 
pulled over for running a red light by a California Highway Patrol officer.  Mr. 
Frye had been allegedly been drinking alcohol and could not produce a driver’s 
license.  It was a hot night, and many people were outside to witness the event, 
including, eventually, Mr. Frye’s mother.  An altercation began between Mr. 
Frye, his mother and the police and ended with Mr. Frye, his brother and his 
mother under arrest.  The crowd became rowdier when the LA police (LAPD) 
arrived in response to a the highway patrol officers distress call, and more general 
violence in the Watts ghetto broke out as the crowd “stoned passing automobiles, 
assaulted white motorists, and threatened a police command post.”  The tensions 
from this event tipped off a six-day urban riot that spread throughout LA 
(Obserschall, 1965).  The Watts riot resulted in 3,927 arrests, more than 1,000 
injuries, 600 buildings damaged and 34 deaths.5   
 
Governor Pat Brown appointed a commission of six whites and two 
African-Americans to prepare “an objective and dispassionate study” of the Watts 
Riots.  The commission interviewed 79 witnesses and questioned around 10,000 
people about the events.  On December 2, 1965, three months after the 
commission began, it produced its report, “Violence in the City—and End of a 
Beginning?” The report was short, only 88 pages, and the description of the riots 
was only about 15 pages. 
 
“Violence in the City”, also known as the McCone Commission report, 
presented what might be read as the “Riffraff Theory” of the Watts Riots.  Police 
Chief Parker was blamed by many South LA residents for exacerbating tensions 
with the African American community by disregarding widespread claims of 
police abuse – including claims of excessive force and routine use of abusive 
language.  Parker himself was widely quoted publicly denouncing rioters as 
“monkeys in the zoo” (Oberschall, 1965; p. 324).  Yet the McCone exculpated 
Whites, including the police, from blame, focusing instead on “social, economic 
and psychological conditions” that faced rioters, but still placed blame on the 
Watts residents.  The commission found that (1) less than 3 percent of the ghetto 
population participated in the riots; (2) that rioters were “riffraff” meaning 
unemployed, young, criminals and outsiders; and (3) that the majority of the 
Black population opposed the riots.  
 
The McCone Commission and Chief Parker weren’t alone in hurling racial 
invective at the rioters.  Future California governor Ronald Regan referred to the 
rioters as “law-breakers and mad dogs,” and Parker insisted that the riots were the 
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work of “a gang of Negro Hoodlums” (Cohen and Murphy, 1968; Perlestein, 
2008) and “monkeys in the zoo” (Obserschall, 1965).  LA Mayor Yorty insisted 
that a small portion of the ghetto community had instigated the riots and had 
expertise in areas such as making Molotov Cocktails, a fact that was rejected by 
the McCone Commission.  
 
The national reaction to the riots was quite different. The Kerner 
Commission, as it was named after its chairman, delivered a report starkly in 
contrast to the McCone commission.  The riots that produced a nationwide 
disturbance in 1967 created a space in which to challenge the riffraff theory that 
was advanced by the McCone Commission (1965). The Kerner Report saw the 
violence as criminal, but also as response to oppression, and something that could 
only be cured by a change in the actions of White America.  
 
The riots were the product both of increasing crime and disorder in inner 
cities and increasing tension and conflict between citizens and police in those 
same neighborhoods.  Surveys in that era showed that “nonwhites were more 
apprehensive than whites” (Weiner and Wolfgang, 1989) They had reason to be, 
as the number of index crimes in the cities (“homicide, forcible rape, aggravated 
assault, robbery, burglary, grand larceny and auto theft”) in proportion to the 
population, was nearly three times higher than in the surrounding suburbs.  Most 
of the victims of crimes were other city residents, meaning that nonwhites were 
far more likely, in some instances 78% more likely, to be the victims of crimes.  
 
The scars of the riots remain visible today – 50 years later – in two ways.  
First, the scars are painfully visible in the physical landscape of a few stubbornly 
poor cities, as well as those where poverty and crime have abated.  In both 
gentrifying Harlem and chronically poor Newark, vacant lots and abandoned 
buildings or factories are visceral physical reminders of the struggles of that era.  
But the scars also remain visible in a philosophy and jurisprudence of criminal 
law that has instantiated the disparate fates of racial minorities in the criminal 
justice system.  A sign of the legacy of the close connection between race, police 
and riots could be seen in the police posture toward rioters in the Rodney King 
riots in Los Angeles that erupted in 1992.  There, the police were known to use 
the term NHI – “No Humans Involved” – when issuing radio calls to patrolling 
officers who were being sent to homes in Black sections of the city (Christopher 
Commission, 1998). 
 
 
Scandals 
 
The riots of the 1960s and the recurring crime epidemics through the 
1990s show the complexity of the policing task in American cities over the past 
50 years.  In LA and NYC, persistent high crime rates contributed to stressors on 
the forces that led to both systemic pathologies in the form of racial conflict and 
corruption scandals, and then unprecedented large scale institutional reforms to 
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policing.  We detail the paths of institutional reform and its predicates in each 
city, with important lessons about both the intersections of these stories and the 
divergent paths that followed reform and transformation. 
 
Los Angeles  
 
The history of corruption within the LAPD ranks during the first half of 
the 20th century lead the organization under police Chief William H. Parker and 
his successors to separate itself from the political establishment.  The LAPD was 
managed from 1950 - 1966 by Chief Parker, who – despite the Watts riots – was 
celebrated within the police profession for innovation in civil service protections 
of officers and command staff, professional development and training, and vice 
enforcement.6  Parker’s innovations came after a previous half century of repeated 
corruption scandals and frequent turnover of police chiefs.7  
 
While the McCone Commission report offers very little in the way of 
direct criticism of the LAPD, the report does note the problems between the 
LAPD and the African American community.  It suggested the need to “place 
greater emphasis on their responsibilities for crime prevention as an essential 
element of the law enforcement task, and that they institute improved means for 
handling citizen complaints and community relationships” (McCone, 1965; part 
5).  In particular, the report offers suggestions for revamping the citizen complaint 
process to increase the transparency of the system and prevent conflict of 
interests, where police commanders were required to review complaints against 
their own subordinate officers (see Abu-Lughod, 2007).  
 
The LAPD through the history of police chiefs Parker, Davis, and Gates 
was focused on professional police administration and not known for its 
community relations.  It also became politically insulated from both democratic 
regulation and administrative accountability.  The Los Angeles City Council, at 
the urging of Chief Parker, enacted an appointment process for its chief of police 
that guaranteed virtual lifetime tenure (Greene, 1998).  These three chiefs moved 
toward a strong centralized command and control that emphasized full 
enforcement of the law and limited officer discretion.  The eclipse of political 
control and external accountability over the LAPD insulated it and fostered its 
own cultural norms (Christopher Commission, 1991; Greene, 1998) where police 
legitimacy strictly an administrative rather than a normative matter.  Partnership 
with the community was simply not a paramount in this design of police 
professionalism. 
  
At the same time, communities in South LA near Watts were still very 
much attuned to the legacy of the Watts riots of 1965.  Full and formal 
enforcement of the law was not what residents of South LA neighborhoods had in 
mind for police reform when they complained in 1965 about police abuse, 
entrenched poverty, inadequate access to housing and schools, and crime.  Despite 
the structural problems noted in the McCone Commission report, concentrated 
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poverty, racial segregation, and poor police-community relations remained 
endemic of LA through the 1970s and 1980s.  Formal, militarized policing 
embraced by Chief Gates in zones that are best portrayed as “poverty traps” 
(Bowles, Durlauf and Huff, 2006) was a prescription for tensions and a breach in 
trust between minority citizens and the police. 
 
It was in this context of 25 years of a politically isolated police force and a 
social and economically isolated and impoverished minority community that two 
scandals emerged within a decade.  Both shook the LAPD from its closed posture 
and launched the processes of reform.   
 
On March 3, 1991 an African American resident named Rodney King 
attempted to evade a traffic stop by the LAPD.  His arrest and beating were 
caught on videotape and “went viral” long before there was You Tube, much less 
a widely accessible internet.8  The subsequent acquittal of LAPD police officers 
charged with the beating of King sparked the 1992 LA urban riots.  Like the 
August 1965 Watts riots, police abuse of authority (Christopher Commission, 
1991) was again the touchstone event that triggered massive riots that spread from 
LA to other cities.  The fact that the King incident lead to such violent protests 
was indicative of the deep tensions that existed in South LA neighborhoods, and 
in particular the poor relations with the African American community.9   
 
 Mayor Tom Bradley appointed a commission headed by Warren 
Christopher to investigate the King beating and the riots; its 1991 report provided 
the catalyst for change in the LAPD.  The Commission found the LAPD had 
created a “crime fighter” and “warrior” culture among its officers that rewarded 
high arrest rates and overwhelming force when civilians resisted arrest. The 
department rejected the moves to community policing that had become an 
important innovation in policing elsewhere in the nation (Christopher 
Commission, 1991). 
 
In June 1992, LA City Council followed the Christopher Commission’s 
recommendations and replaced Daryl Gates with former Philadelphia Police 
Commissioner Willie L. Williams, who was the first African American police 
chief of LA.10  Two years later, the LAPD issued a strategic plan, “Commitment 
to Action,” which called for partnerships between the police, community and 
other branches of local government.  The plan involved a revamping of the Basic 
Car Strategy, which set up a defined neighborhood area for a dedicated patrol car 
all under the guide of one of eighteen LAPD defined community police divisions 
(defined by police with community input), and increased training of senior and 
new recruits on community and problem solving policing strategies (Glenn et al., 
2003).11   These were the first halting steps by the LAPD toward a community 
policing model.  Figure 1 shows an example of the Rampart Community Police 
Division and corresponding basic car areas.  The Rampart police division, as we 
discuss later, becomes an important part of the story of scandal and reform. 
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Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Still, there was intense resistance to community policing within the LAPD 
middle and upper management ranks (Glenn et al., 2003), eventually costing 
Williams his job.  He was replaced in August 1997 by Deputy Chief Bernard C. 
Parks, the city’s second African American chief.  Parks, even while attempting to 
build community ties, focused his efforts on tactical units to combat crime.  In the 
next section, when we examine crime trends in Los Angeles, we will show that 
crime dropped significantly under Chief Williams, and rose again under Chief 
Parks. 
 
It was on Parks’ watch that the Rampart scandal was uncovered, the 
second deep scandal in the LAPD within a decade.  On September 21, 1999, 
Parks formed a board of inquiry (BOI) of LAPD command staff to examine the 
depth of the alleged corruption in the Rampart police division and the celebrated 
CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) program.  The BOI 
report focused almost exclusively on the problem of a few corrupt officers and not 
the systemic problems within the LAPD (Board of Inquiry into the Rampart 
Corruption Incident, Public Report, 2000).12  A subsequent report commissioned 
by the LA Police Commission criticized the LAPD for its failure to address larger 
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problems in the department’s internal culture that rewarded the ends-justify-the-
means approach to crime fighting (Report of the Independent Review Panel, 
2000).  The fallout of the LA Police Commission review panel was apparent.  By 
2005 the California court’s overturned 100 falsely obtained convictions, 20 
officers were removed or left duty, and just over $70 million was paid in civil 
settlements as a result of this corruption scandal.13 
 
The Rampart scandal set the stage for the two measures that have led to 
major changes in the internal operation of the LAPD and its relationship to the 
community: federal civil rights litigation that produced nine years of federal 
oversight under a Consent Decree negotiated with the U.S. Department of Justice, 
and the hiring of Commissioner William Bratton to oversee the transformation of 
the LAPD. Those stories are told in the sections that follow.  
 
New York 
 
One of the legacies of the riots in NYC was the ascension of a new class 
of political leaders from the city’s African American and Latino communities.  
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was elected to Congress representing Harlem in 1960, 
and immediately raised issues of civil rights, including police misconduct, both on 
the floor of the House and also in Harlem and across the city’s minority 
neighborhoods.  Powell was especially hard on the NYPD, accusing police in 
Harlem of corruption that included providing protection to drug sellers in return 
for lucrative payoffs.  Powell had some history to draw on, including a scandal 
involving a gambler, Harry Gross, who made payoffs regularly to every precinct 
in Brooklyn (English, 2011).  The Gross scandal led to hundreds of arrests and 
convictions.  The trail of payoffs eventually led to City Hall and forced the 
resignation of Mayor William O’Dwyer. 
 
 Powell’s accusations, which he made in 1960, even before the riots, 
presaged the corruption scandal of 1964 involving the NYPD’s elite 48-person 
“Watchdog” group.  The most volatile scandal was dramatized by the revelations 
of Detective Frank Serpico, and became public news in 1971.  His disclosures of 
pandemic corruption and cover-ups led to the appointment of the Knapp 
Commission in 1970.  The antecedents of this scandal lie in the ashes of the 
1960s, and could be traced to three narratives.  First, in the wake of the riots, a 
heroin epidemic spread through the NYC’s minority neighborhoods (Preble and 
Casey, 1969).  Drug distribution organizations profited heavily, as did secondary 
markets in prostitution, gambling and fencing goods stolen by addicts.  These 
networks depended on police protection.  Testimony before the Knapp 
Commission revealed how, fueled by the new economics of heroin distribution, 
the residual system of low-level routine payoffs and minor acts of corruption 
among police suddenly became big business, reaching from the lowest ranks of 
patrol officers through the detective branches, and into some corners of the 
command ranks (Knapp Commission Report, 1972).14 
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Second, the late 1960s was a period of political violence in NYC.  Both in 
NYC and elsewhere, revolutionary groups including the Black Panther Party, the 
Weather Underground, and smaller groups all engaged in either shootings of 
police officers or conspiracies to bomb public places.  Although the ambitions of 
these groups outstripped their impacts, they were seen by NYPD officers as an 
imminent threat to their lives.  In addition to a conspiracy indictment against the 
Panthers, the shooting of a police officer at a Harlem Mosque in 1972 set off 
sparks of conflict not only between the police and the Nation of Islam community 
in Harlem, but between the police union, police commanders and city leaders over 
blame for the officers’ death.  Blame was at first placed on then Lieutenant 
Benjamin Ward, who a decade later went on to become the City’s first African 
American police commissioner.  The conflicts with community and the external 
threats against police officers shielded public attention from the spreading 
knowledge of corruption in the NYPD. 
 
The third narrative was the political hangover from the battle over civilian 
review of the NYPD.  In 1966, Mayor John Lindsay created a Civilian Complaint 
Review Board (CCRB) to address citizen grievances against police for excessive 
force, false arrest, and other forms of police misconduct.  The move came at a 
time of racial polarization in NYC over citizen control of schools, a conflict that 
played out both publicly and bitterly in the predominantly African American 
Brownsville neighborhood in Brooklyn.  The police union, the Patrolman’s 
Benevolent Association, pledged to empty its treasury to defeat Lindsay’s 
creation (Perlestein, 2008).  After a 1966 riot in Brownsville, site of the school 
conflict, the PBA qualified a referendum on the November ballot to dissolve the 
CCRB.  The CCRB was defeated in a 55-40 landslide. 
 
One of the sites of the scandals that led to the Knapp Commission Report 
was the 30th Precinct in Harlem, which 30 years later became site of another 
NYPD drug corruption scandal, known as the “Dirty 30.”  The Knapp 
Commission was formed in 1970 to investigate police corruption, based in no 
small part on Serpico’s 1971 whistle-blowing testimony and that of fellow-officer 
Sergeant David Durk.  The Commission, officially known as the Commission to 
Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, in fact didn’t begin its hearings until after 
Serpico’s revelations to the Commission’s investigators.  The commission 
produced criminal indictments against corrupt police officials and officers, and 
led to the replacement of Commissioner Howard Leary (a Lindsay appointee) 
with Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy.  Murphy was tasked to clean up the 
department rather than redesign its strategies and tactics.  Murphy implemented 
proactive integrity checks, oversaw massive transfers of senior personnel, 
implemented mandatory job rotation in key areas, and provided funds to pay 
informants.  He also went after citizens who were complicit in attempts to bribe 
police officers.  
 
Within two decades, a second corruption scandal erupted, with the drug 
trade again central to the narrative.  Again, the Mayor, David Dinkins, appointed 
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former judge Milton Mollen in July 1992 to head The City of New York 
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-
Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, popularly referred to as the 
Mollen Commission.  The Mollen Commission was tasked to investigate “the 
nature and extent of corruption in the Department; evaluate the departments 
procedures for preventing and detecting that corruption; and recommend changes 
and improvements to those procedures” (Mollen Commission Report, 1994).  
Mollen carefully drew lines to distinguish the corruption patterns uncovered by 
the Knapp Commission from the corruption of the Mollen era.  Corruption during 
the Knapp investigation was systemic: a pattern of monetary exchanges between 
criminals and police, with an unspoken agreement to conceal other forms of 
police misconduct including brutality and other constitutional violations.  In other 
words, Knapp revealed a culture and practice where criminals and police officers 
gave and took bribes, and bought and sold protection.  Corruption was, 
essentially, consensual.   
 
Mollen’s investigation revealed patterns, deeply ingrained in the police 
culture, of brutality, theft, abuse of authority and active police criminality (Mollen 
Commission, 1994).  The commission report described a nexus between 
corruption and brutality, which essentially doubled down on the Knapp-era 
scandals.  One testifying officer, Michael Dowd, discussed the deep place of this 
nexus in the culture of the NYPD. "[Brutality] is a form of acceptance. It's not just 
simply giving a beating. It's [sic] the other officers beginto accept you more” 
(Mollen Commission, 1994).  Officer Dowd and others described hundreds of acts 
of brutality they had engaged in; yet apparently no fellow officer had filed a 
complaint about either one of them.  Officers primarily from the 30th, 9th, 46th, 
75th and 73rd precincts were caught selling drugs and beating suspects.15  The 
Dirty 30 scandal resulted in nearly one hundred convictions against seventy 
defendants being thrown out due to police perjury (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). 
With approximately fifteen lawsuits still pending, the city has already paid $2 
million in civil settlements to perjury victims (David Kocieniewski, "Man framed 
by police officers wins payments," New York Times, February 12, 1998). 
 
The scandal bled into the regime of the next police commissioner, William 
Bratton, who was appointed in 1994, shortly before the Mollen Commission report 
was published.  In his efforts to reform the department, Bratton stated that if 
officers behaved properly, he would back them absolutely, but if they used 
unnecessary force, “all bets are off” (New York Times, 1994).  Yet, when a 
civilian deputy commissioner in charge of internal affairs pushed for the creation 
of a special anti-brutality unit that would be available twenty-four hours a day to 
investigate allegations promptly, he was forced out of the department in 1995 
(Kraus, 1995; Human Rights Watch, n.d.).  Although most of the reforms 
recommended by the Mollen Commission  -- improvements in recruiting, scrutiny 
during probation, integrity training, and improved supervision – were 
implemented by 1998 (Herbert, 1998), the tensions from as far back as the 1960s 
and the struggle for police oversight were a constant in the culture of the NYPD.  
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The PBA continued to oppose Bratton’s stricter disciplinary measures, and the 
Mollen Commission's call for changes in the police union's response to allegations 
of corruption.  Indeed, litigation surrounding the Abner Louima assault by NYPD 
officers in 1997,16 implicated the police union in the cover-up of that infamous 
incident.  
 
Reform 
 
The common thread in the stories of police reform in LA and NYC is not 
just the presence of William Bratton, but the critical role of scandal as a launching 
pad for reform.  In LA, Commissioner Bratton used the platform of scandal and 
an external commission to achieve reforms both in accountability of individual 
officers, while internally pursuing the types of strategic and tactical reforms that 
have been influential across the country.  In NYC, Bratton also benefited from a 
scandal – the Dirty 30 – that created a political space in which he could 
implement both management and tactical reforms in the political slipstream of the 
Mollen Commission’s findings without the external constraint of litigation.  And, 
in a similar pattern, Bratton used both scandal and litigation as a rationale for 
departmental reform in LA, where he relied both on his own instincts and the 
reform insights gained in NYC. 
 
 The Rampart scandal, the review, and subsequent consent decree set the 
stage for a new era of management reform in LAPD.  On October 2002 William J. 
Bratton was appointed as LAPD’s police chief.  Bratton having served as Chief of 
NYPD and instituting its COMPSTAT program brought a similar management 
philosophy to the LAPD.  From 1996 to his appointment as LAPD chief of police 
Bratton had worked in the private sector, including serving as a consultant for 
Kroll Associates monitoring team oversaw the implementation of the Federal 
Consent Decree with the LAPD.17   
 
Bratton’s primary focus was on implementing steps of the consent decree 
and instituting COMPSTAT within the LAPD command staff.  His management 
philosophy was to use COMPSTAT to make strategic decisions about officer 
deployment and to set police division benchmarks for crime reductions.  In 
contrast to previous efforts to reduce crime, this new LAPD approach did not rely 
exclusively on specialized units and tactical responses.  Instead, each division 
captain was going to be responsible for crime trends and formulating a response 
in his or her police area.  The LAPD instituted this approach under the title of 
COMPSTAT Plus and directed by George Gascon, LAPD Assistant Chief of 
Police and Director of Operations.   
 
In contrast to the NYPD COMPSTAT model where performance was 
benchmarked in monthly command staff meetings, COMPSTAT Plus involved 
detailed inspections of underperforming police divisions.  For police divisions 
that were underperforming Gascon assigned an audit team of LAPD commanders 
who would inspect the current patrol, investigation, analysis, and management 
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and supervision of these areas.  After a thorough review was conducted the audit 
team would work with the police division to develop its own strategic plan to 
meet the crime reduction goals.18  It is notable that this approach to policing was a 
sea change in LAPD.  Never before had the approach to reducing crime focused 
on a community-wide approach that relied primarily on line-officers and 
command staff.  Gone was the sole focus on tactical units that had been the staple 
LAPD approach dating back to the Parker administration.  The model of 
COMPSTAT Plus, however, was based on police accountability to the crime rates 
and not improving community sentiment.  Although one can reasonably argue that 
the LAPD was mindful that reducing crime could in turn improve public 
sentiment, even in the African American community, community policing was not 
a central player in the department’s organizational change.  Interestingly, the 
LAPD continued to direct its field services through its community policing plan, 
and the use of the Basic Car remained part of the LAPD organization, but the 
actual benchmarks of the organization were not strictly on community-
relationship building.   
 
Like NYC, LA witnessed a significant reduction in crime rates after the 
implementation of Bratton’s COMPSTAT approach.  But in contrast to the NYPD 
model, the COMPSTAT Plus approach did not result in the rapid reallocation of 
line officers to impact zones or the deployment of aggressive stop and frisk 
polices.  While research on motor vehicle stops conducted as part of the consent 
decree found numerous geographic disparities in the rates of motor vehicle stops, 
these disparities cannot be tied the movement of police personnel in response to 
strategic crime reduction goals (Alpert et al., 2006; Ayres and Borowsky, 2008).  
By the time Bratton resigned as police chief in October, 2009 he oversaw a six-
year consecutive decline in crime, the lifting of the Federal Consent Decree, and 
no major corruption scandals.  At present it is unclear whether his replacement 
LAPD Chief Charlie Beck will continue to focus resources on the COMPSTAT 
model or develop other strategies.  It is notable that Charlie Beck was appointed, 
in part, because of his reputation for community collaboration, including 
overseeing relationships with the business improvement districts and non-profit 
services groups in MacArthur Park, located in the Rampart Division, and 
Downtown LA.19    
 
 
Litigation 
 
In each city, litigation formed the legacy of the crime declines and the 
scandals of the1990s.  It also was a background drama in the consolidation of 
crime declines through the following decades.  Litigation was an essential 
intervention that complemented the internal management reforms of Chief 
Bratton, and was part of the fabric of policing during most of his tenure in LA.  In 
NYC, the threat of litigation was raised in 1999 by an investigation by the New 
York State Attorney General Litigation of alleged civil rights violations, including 
racial profiling, by the NYPD.  Litigation was a constant in the political and 
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policing environment since 2001, but with seemingly little effect (Fagan et al., 
2010).  The case studies of each city show the stark differences in the responses to 
litigation by each city and its police, and raise important questions about what 
litigation can achieve as an intervention in police reform. 
 
 Los Angeles 
 
The next phase of attempted LAPD reform came through outside 
intervention. On November 2000 the city of LA entered into a consent decree 
with the U.S. Department of Justice to oversee the operations of the LAPD, in 
part responding to the specific Rampart scandal as well as a concern with 
widespread police abuse of authority violating constitutional guarantees of 
citizens under the 4th and 14th amendments.  This five-year term of the consent 
decree dedicated a large share of oversight to the review of procedures of 
management and supervision of officers to promote civil rights integrity as well as 
the conduct of general police activity, including the use of stop, search, and arrest 
powers.  Included in the consent were specific provisions that indicated “LAPD 
officers may not use race, color, ethnicity, or national origin (to any extent or 
degree) in conducting stops or detentions, or activities following stops or 
detentions, except when engaging in appropriate suspect-specific activity to 
identify a particular person or group.” (Consent Decree, p. 40).  And, the consent 
decree also required that LAPD officers to complete an “electronic report each 
time an officer conducts a motor vehicle stop” (Consent Decree, p. 40).   
 
The Consent Decree was helpful to Commissioner Bratton in his program 
of reform, both internally and externally.  Many of the requirements of the 
Consent Decree worked reciprocally but in parallel to the strategic, tactical and 
cultural innovations that he pursued.  Whether the litigation was successful, 
however, was sharply contested.  An analysis of the reforms of the LAPD under 
the Consent Decree was sought by the Los Angeles Police Foundation, an 
independent organization that supports the activities of the LAPD (Stone et al., 
2009).   The report found that the LAPD was in substantial compliance with the 
terms of the Consent Decree, and was a factor in the decision by the U.S. District 
Court Gary A. Fress to terminate the consent decree in July 2009.  In his order, 
Judge Fress noted that: "When the Decree was entered, LAPD was a troubled 
department whose reputation had been severely damaged by a series of crises….. 
In 2008, as noted by the Monitor, 'LAPD has become the national and 
international policing standard for activities that range from audits to handling of 
the mentally ill to many aspects of training to risk assessment of police officers 
and more.’”20 	  
 The conditions cited in the report that suggest substantial reform are in 
fact a curious mixture of increases in policing coupled with reports of citizen 
approval of police effectiveness in the heavily policed African American and 
Hispanic communities.  The report describes a declining rate of use of force at the 
same time that both pedestrian and motor vehicle stops doubled over the seven 
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years of the consent decree.  Arrests rose in the period of the consent decree, as 
did arrests per stop, while prosecutorial declinations declined (Stone et al., 2009).  
These increases were seen as successes, despite the general view that arrest 
should be a last resort when policing crime and disorder, a notion endorsed in the 
“Broken Windows” framework (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) that informed the 
NYPD reforms under Commissioner Bratton (Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Maple 
and Mitchell, 1999).  The increased police activity was seen as a positive sign that 
litigation didn’t inevitably lead to a withdrawal from policing, or de-policing, by 
officers fearing increased departmental oversight and scrutiny. 
 
 Two other indicia suggest that the reforms left substantial room for 
improvement.  According to the Stone et al. (2009) report, more than two-thirds 
of Hispanic and African American residents rated the LAPD as doing a “good” or 
“excellent” job at controlling crime and calling offenders to account.  But other 
indicia suggest that a substantial minority within each of these groups was 
dissatisfied with the LAPD.  One in ten African American residents reported that 
almost "none" of the LAPD officers they encounter treat them and their friends 
and families with "courtesy or respect".  The other indicia that suggests a more 
moderate impact of the Consent Decree is the persistence of racial disparities in 
police-citizen contacts.   
 
 It is surprising that approval of the LAPD is so strong given the 
demography of police-citizen contacts in Los Angeles (Ayres and Borowsky, 
2008) and the increase in the incidence of both non-arrest and arrest contacts 
between citizens and police.  Analyzing stop data from 2004, the only year made 
available to them, Ayres and Borowsky (2008) reported statistically significant 
higher rates of police stops, searches, citations, and arrests of African American 
and Hispanic persons compared to Whites, even after controlling for location 
differences in the city.  They also report that “hit rates” from stops, frisks and 
searches were significantly lower for non-whites compared to white suspects.  
Ayres and Borowsky (2008) reject a claim that these rates reflect higher rates of 
criminality among minority citizens, citing the lower rates of seizure of weapons, 
drugs or other contraband, or arrests on outstanding warrants. 
 
 The two pictures of the consent decree mirror the experiences of other 
cities that were placed under federal court supervision through court-appointed 
monitors (Schwartz, 2010; Fagan and Geller, 2010).  One reason for the gap in 
these narratives about the consent decrees is the difference in emphasis on which 
factors matter to which communities.  To a court, or perhaps to a public seeking a 
more accountable and professional police regime, the reforms in the inner 
workings of the department were good news.  But to those who sought relief from 
policing excesses or constitutional violations in decisions on whom to stop and 
search for suspicious behaviors, the failure to curtail racial disparities suggests 
that the excesses of the pre-litigation era remain unabated.  Accountability, then, 
has two different faces – internal accountability for professionalism and good 
management, and external reforms for accountable and performance-based 
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policing.   One might reasonably ask whether the achieved reforms, however 
welcomed and needed they may be, are the right reforms when the racial 
disparities in police conduct that motivated the litigation remain persistent 
realities of policing.  
  
 
New York 
 
 The cycles of scandal – both large and small - and reform that have 
burdened the NYPD for nearly 50 years led to litigation against the City of New 
York and the NYPD in the late 1990s.  And since that time, class action litigation 
(as opposed to individual civil actions) has multiplied to the present day.   Two 
incidents in particular motivated first an investigation of the NYPD by the New 
York State Attorney General, and then litigation based on the investigation 
reports.   One was the 1997 assault on Abner Louima in a NYPD precinct station, 
and the other was the killing of an uarmed citizen, Amadou Diallo, by officers 
who were part of an elite Street Crime Unit that conducted aggressive stops and 
searches in the hunt for guns.  The SCU was formed early in the Bratton police 
administration in New York, and was expanded following Commissioner 
Bratton’s resignation in 1996.  The cascade of these two scandals animated both 
the NYS AG investigation as well as the litigation that followed. 
 
 The Spitzer Report, as the AG investigation was known, cited evidence 
that the NYPD engaged in racially biased police practices in the conduct of 
decisions on whom to stop and frisk (Spitzer, 1999; Gelman, Fagan and Kiss, 
2007).  About one stop in six lacked a clearly articulated justification on forms 
filled out by the NYPD, and nearly one in four lacked sufficient documentation to 
render a judgment of its constitutionality.  The racial disproportionality was stark:  
Black New Yorkers were nearly three times as likely to be stopped relative to 
their crime rate as were White New Yorkers; the comparable rate for Hispanics 
was about half the disparity for Blacks. While there has been some debate about 
the causes of these disparities (Ridgeway, 2007), no one can deny that Blacks and 
Hispanics were  feeling the brunt of the NYPD’s stop and frisk tactics and that 
these disparities are not a simple artifact of differences in crime rates between 
areas that different groups inhabit.   
 
 The Center for Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit, Kelvin Daniels v City 
of New York, in 2001, relying on the Spitzer report as evidence, coupled with the 
testimony of a class of plaintiffs.  The litigation was settled in an agreement in 
December 2003 that – unlike the Los Angeles consent decree – did not include 
court oversight. NYC promised to reduce racial disparities in police stops, to 
improve documentation, and to reject racial profiling as a basis for conducting 
street stops.  Training on constitutional requirements for street stops and other 
reforms designed to increase constitutional compliance also were designed.  
Assorted other reforms were promised, including the conduct of citizen forums 
and community surveys.  Documentation of street stops, thought to be spotty at 
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best by the Spitzer investigation, was integrated into the COMPSTAT system of 
crime accounting. 
 
 Daniels was, however, a failure.  There was no internal report comparable 
to the Stone et al. (2009) assessment of the LAPD to determine whether there 
were significant or effective institutional reforms that resulted from Daniels.  
Even so, lawyers for the Daniels plaintiffs reported that there was little 
compliance with the terms of the settlement.  And, there was an exponential 
growth in street stops during the interval of the Daniels settlement.  Fagan et al. 
(2010) showed that stops increased 600% between 1998, the year preceding the 
Spitzer Report, and 2006, a year before the December 2007 expiration of the 
Daniels Consent Decree.  Almost all of the increase during that time was in 
districts that were predominantly populated by African Americans.  Fagan et al. 
(2010) observed that the increases were present even after controlling for race-
specific crime rates in each police precinct.  Similar patterns, though smaller in 
magnitude but still statistically significant, were found for areas with 
concentrations of Hispanic residents. The “yield” from these stops was low – 
about one gun seized for every thousand stops, and arrests in about one stop in 20.   
Figure 2 shows the growth in racial disparity throughout this period. While the 
NYPD claims that the growth in stops has kept crime rates low (Smith & Purtell, 
2007), Figure 2 suggests that in fact, crime rates were declining since long before 
the run-up in stops, and have in fact been declining in NYC since 1991 (Zimring, 
2011). 
 
 Daniels failed for four reasons. First, there was the absence of any external 
oversight or enforcement of reforms.  Essentially, the NYPD and the City 
promised to reform, but faced no incentive to do so in a timely fashion.  Second, 
the NYPD firmly believed that these tactics were essential in keeping the crime 
rate low and to maintain its slow decline through the decade following the 
appointment of Raymond Kelly as Police Commissioner. Third, there was public 
support to continue these tactics.21  The support was equivocal in the minority 
communities, where stops were most heavily concentrated, and was strong in 
predominantly White sectors of NYC.  Accordingly, there was no sense of 
urgency among community or political leaders to hold the NYPD accountable for 
compliance with the terms of the settlement that largely impacted minority 
communities.  Perhaps most important was the timing of the litigation: Daniels 
was filed in 2001, before the 9/11 terror attacks, and shortly afterward, the Police 
Commissioner Bernard Kerik – in his final year in office – very publicly 
renounced racial profiling. And within a few months, the 9/11 attacks generated 
widespread support if not admiration for the NYPD.  In that climate, there was no 
political will or even attention to the issues raised by Daniels and the state 
Attorney General Spitzer before that. 
 
 But the most significant reason for the failure of Daniels was the structure 
of the stipulated settlement agreement.  The terms did not include an external or 
court-appointed monitor, a departure from other consent decrees or collaborative 
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agreements negotiated around the same time, including the Los Angeles Consent 
Decree.  There were no stated performance benchmarks to assess changes in 
racial disparities in stops and frisks. There was no requirement for public release 
of data.  Rather, the NYPD were required to produce reports to plaintiffs and 
later, to the City Council, a requirement they ignored until the shooting death of 
Sean Bell in November 2006, a year before the scheduled expiration of the 
Daniels settlement, in a botched undercover operation.  There were no 
requirements for evaluation of training or other personnel management systems.  
There was no external auditing of the data and the routine reports on the bases for 
citizen stops consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements.  When violations 
were detected, as in the case of the 600% increase in stops from 2003-2006 that 
exacerbated racial disparities (Fagan et al., 2010), there was no enforcement 
mechanism for readdressing these practices.  The NYC settlement agreement 
stands in sharp contrasts to the consent decree in Los Angeles that required active 
monitoring of racial disparities in stop, arrests, and use of force behaviors by the 
LAPD. One can only imagine what reforms and changes in transparency might 
have occurred if the NYPD had been subject to similar oversight. 
 
 
Figure 2: Terry Stops and Felony Crimes per 100,000 Persons,  
New York City, 1998-2009 
 
Source: New York City Police Department, Various Years; Fagan et al., 2010; 
Uniform Crime Reports, various years 
 
  The growing disparities led to a second lawsuit, filed immediately upon 
the expiration of the Daniels settlement, by the same civil rights organization that 
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had filed Daniels: the Center for Constitutional Rights.   The litigation continues 
through this writing with the case Floyd et al. v. City of New York.22   In addition, 
two other lawsuits have been filed, Davis et al. v City of New York in 2010, and 
Ligon et al. v City of New York in 2012. Each alleges both racial discrimination 
and Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) violations in the conduct of police 
operations in the apartment buildings that characterize much of the City’s housing 
stock.  Plaintiffs in Davis allege discrimination in the conduct of stops and the 
enforcement of trespass laws in public housing complexes.  Plaintiffs in Ligon 
allege similar claims in the enforcement of these laws in privately owned 
buildings.  In each case, the litigation cites abuses under the NYPD’s Operation 
Clean Halls program, where officers conduct patrols in the lobbies and stairwells 
of privately-owned buildings – with the consent of the landlords – searching for 
persons who are illegally in the buildings.23 The City says these tactics are 
essential to eliminating longstanding problems of drug dealing and related 
violence in these buildings.  But residents are mixed on these tactics, and the 
plaintiffs complain not only of illegal searches, but of often being arrested in their 
own buildings that they are legally allowed to be in. 
 
 The persistence of litigation in NYC suggests both the animating power of 
scandal to provoke litigation, but also the limitations of political regulation and 
accountability in policing in the post-Mollen era.  It’s not just class action 
litigation that characterizes this climate, but private litigation as well: according to 
the City Comptroller, New York City has paid out over $570 million in 
settlements of individual private law suits in the past decade (Liu, 2011).  
 
 Litigation in NYC, and the disagreements over the impacts of the litigation 
in LA, suggests a further and difficult question:  whether the aggressive and 
proactive policing tactics that characterize both cities inevitably will lead to racial 
conflict and litigation.  Perhaps the absence of meaningful regulation of the police 
in NYC, dating back at least 50 years, creates a political climate where 
accountability and lawfulness is secondary both to the norms of the police culture 
and the demands for security at all costs.  The scandals dating back to the 1960s 
and before suggest that this is not simply a matter of high crime eras, for as we 
show below, that era ended both in NYC and LA a decade ago.  Rather, the 
persistence of litigation and the allegations that these lawsuits seek to address, 
may suggest a more disturbing notion of the endogeneity of such norms in the 
modern policing institution when unabated by outside intervention.  LA, as we 
suggest in our epilogue on The Future for policing in each city, seems to be on a 
very different path.  In NYC, the bitter war over these three lawsuits suggests a 
dark vision of a permanent divide between the minority citizens of the City and 
the institutions that exist to protect them 
 
Crime and Policing 
 
The connection between the crime reductions in NY and LA since 1990, at 
the height of the crack epidemic in each city, with the cycles of scandal and 
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reform is not a simple calculation.  While notable reforms in policing occurred in 
each city following urban unrest, corruption scandals, internal reforms, and new 
models of policing, it remains unclear how much these cascading dramas shaped 
the crime trends we observe in each city.  In this section we analyze the changes 
in crime rates between 1960 and 2010 in the two cities, using the broader 
historical lens that captures the eras of unrest, rising crime, scandal and reform.  
We focus on only robbery and homicide rates because these crimes are less likely 
to be influenced by changes in police reporting practices over this time period.  
Homicide in particular has not changed by definition.  And, there are reasons to 
expect that the police generally do not under report homicides.24  
  
The 50 Year Arc 
 
 The trends over the 50 year period in robbery and homicide rates in the 
two cities are very similar in both timing and the shape of both increase and 
decline.   Both cities experienced a massive increase in crime between the mid 
1960s and the early 1980s, despite different trajectories in internal governance 
and reforms. In LA, the various efforts of the professional model of law 
enforcement under police chiefs Parker, Davis, and Gates had little discernable 
effect on crime, as measured by robbery or homicide rates through the 1980s. 
Crime rates also rose in NYC under several police commissioners through the 
same eras.  The crime increase in NYC and LA mirrored the crime increase seen 
in the majority of large US cities across this period (UCR, various years), 
suggesting that large secular processes were animating crime trends through 
forces that were beyond the control of local police in any single city.   
 
Bad Things Come in Threes 
 
From the 1960s through the early 1990s, violent crime increased in three 
waves, each one closely tied to an epidemic of drugs – heroin in the late 1960s, 
cocaine and the emergence of street drug markets in the late 1970s, and crack 
cocaine and the rapid expansion of retail drug selling predominantly in American 
inner cities (Johnson et al., 1990). In each city, starting in the mid-1980s, the 
increase was best described as an epidemic of violence, especially among 
adolescents and young adults ages 13-24, (Cook and Laub, 1998).  The coupling 
of the temporal phasing of crime in each city with concurrent drug epidemics has 
been the source of theoretical speculation and empirical analyses (Blumstein, 
1995; Fagan 1990, 1992).  In these renderings of the causes of a violence 
epidemic, the connection was through drug selling in open-air markets (Zimmer, 
1984; Goldstein 1985, 1989; Fagan, 1990) and the proliferation of high caliber 
firearms (Blumstein and Wallman, 2000).  In each city, drug selling organizations 
animated forms of group violence that were tied to the economic instrumentality.  
In Los Angeles, these groups emerged from, and sometimes coincided with, the 
rise of street gangs in the late 1970s.  In New York, drug selling organizations 
dominated territories and markets (Fagan, 1990, 1994; Johnson et al., 1990). 
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Drugs were hardly the only crime correlate that was co-morbidly tied to 
the three-stage run-up in crime.  By the mid-1970s, guns became the majority 
instrumentality in homicide (Zimring and Hawkins, 1997).  We can’t know 
whether the proliferation of gun homicides was the result of excess gun 
manufacture and faulty marketing controls that put guns into the hands of young 
offenders (Hemenway, 2004) or a byproduct of the rapid expansion of inherently 
violent street drug markets (Johnson et al., 1990; Fagan, 1992) in each city.  But 
the fact remains that nearly all of the increase and all of the decline in homicides 
across the 50 year window was due to changes in gun-related deaths (Fagan, 
Zimring and Kim, 1998; Cook and Laub, 2002; Zimring, 2006, 2011; Hemenway, 
2007).   
 
The Crime Declines 
 
 Figures 3 and 4 shows the trends for homicide rates and robbery rates 
between 1960 and 2010 for NY and LA, and begins the discussion of the crime 
declines. In these figures, we placed lines marking years where major police 
issues occurred, including the 1965 Watts riots, the 1991 Safe Streets Act of NY, 
the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the 1994 advent of COMPSTAT in NY and the 
LAPD community policing plan, and the 2002 COMPSTAT+ program launched 
by LAPD police chief William Bratton.   
 
The similarity in the patterns of increase and decline are remarkable.  The 
rates rose and declined in both cities in the same decades, despite public 
perception that the cities are distinct from each other on both crime and its 
correlates.  Again, the shared pattern of increase and decline speaks to the effect 
of more general secular trends that influence cities across the U.S.  Various police 
reforms and innovations occurred between the 1960s and late 1980s, but there is 
little evidence of any influence on the homicide rate. 
 
 The trends show with clarity that policing crises and reforms are 
correlated with general secular trends. When we examine any year as a point of 
departure from the decade specific trends in homicide and robbery for both cities 
it suggests that a police reform contributed to a lower rate of crime. Still, the 
effects of reforms are best viewed as nested in the longer 50-year secular trends in 
these and other major cities (Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer, 2006; Harcourt 
and Ludwig, 2006). Crime rates began declining in each city in 1992, despite 
starkly different political, social and policing environments.  In other words, the 
shared onset and shape of the decline could suggest that policing had little effect.  
So, for example, we could attribute the decline in Los Angeles to the Rodney 
King riots, the appointment of Chief Williams in 1992 to lead the LAPD, the 
work of the Christopher Commission in revealing systemic problems in the LAPD 
and in the communities most heavily policed, or to Chief Williams’ community 
policing plan that began in 1994 (and that was fiercely resisted by the patrol 
force).  In NYC, we could claim that the onset of the crime decline began with 
police reform resulting from the 1991 Safe Streets Act, the implementation of 
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COMPSTAT initiatives and other policy reforms in 1994, or the work of the 
Mollen Commission that investigated police corruption beginning in 1993.  In 
other words, no matter what the political landscape or the specific local crime 
conditions, a secular decline in crime began in the two cities at almost exactly the 
same time, and by the year 1993, this trend was seen in cities across the nation 
(Blumstein and Wallman, 2000). 
 
Figure 3.  Homicide Rates per 100,000 Persons, New York and Los Angeles, 
1960-2010 
 
 
Figure 4.  Robbery Rates per 100,000 Persons, New York and Los Angeles,  
1960-2010 
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Perhaps the most remarkable trend within the larger arc is the sharp 
decline in each city between 1990 and 2000.  Within this shorter period, almost 
any year that we estimate as a parameter in the decade of the 1990s after 1992 in 
either NYC or LA shows a significant downward trend that dominates any reform 
occurring in the following decade, including both the appointment of Chief 
Bratton in Los Angeles and the Consent Decree that went into effect in 2000.  
Even when we adjust for the full series of observations going back to 1960 for 
robbery and homicide, the decline in the near decade from 1992-2000 shows that 
declines in each city were steep and systematic, even under starkly different 
conditions.25   
 
So, while Bratton’s reforms in NYC in the 1990s and in LA a decade later 
showed some promise in reducing crime, one should also point to Chief Willie 
Williams as the great crime drop leader in LA through his effort to institute 
community policing and transform the culture of the LAPD.  The successes of 
Chief Williams were interrupted (and cost him his job) in the trend in LA in the 
years surrounding the Rampart Scandal.  Between 1999 and 2001 both homicide 
and robbery rates in LA reversed course and increased for the first time since the 
early 1990s.  After 2001, with the Rampart Scandal resolved and new 
management in place under Bratton, the decline in LA in robbery and homicide 
resumed.  The salient point here is that in both LA and NYC, in very different 
policing regimes and political and social contexts, a crime decline began that has 
– with the interruption of the Rampart years – sustained for nearly two decades 
into 2010. 
 
 The COMPSTAT Effect 
 
The COMPSTAT innovation used spatial analysis of crime patterns with 
constant updating to drive the allocation of police resources to crime “hot spots”.  
It is an innovation first developed by William Bratton in NYC when he headed 
the NYPD’s Transit Bureau, and he brought it to departmental scale when he was 
appointed Police Commissioner in 1994 (Bratton and Knobler, 2008).  Since then, 
it has been adopted by law enforcement agencies across the country and in several 
cities in Europe and Latin America (Weisburd et al., 2004).  Arguably, its effects 
have most deeply felt in LA and NYC, where Bratton was the police executive 
during the implementation of the management design.26 
 
If we were to focus on only examining the effect of the COMPSTAT 
program in NYC that started in 1994 we see a clear influence of this program in 
reducing robberies and homicides.  Figure 5 shows the linear trends in homicide 
rates for NYC and LA in the years after each city adopted its version of 
COMPSTAT under chief Bratton.  In NYC, the linear trend was 14.5 fewer 
homicides per 100,000 residents after 1994.  In LA, the linear trend was 11.5 
fewer homicides per 100,000 residents after 2002.  These trends suggest that 
COMPSTAT efforts provided a meaningful contribution to the crime decline in 
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each place  But, if we look back to the date of the onset of the crime decline in LA 
in 1994,  the linear trend would be similar to NYC’s – including the three year 
spike in crime between 1999 and 2001 in LA.   
 
Figure 5.  Homicide Rates with Linear Trends in New York and Los Angeles 
following COMPSTAT, 1980-2010 
  
 
 
 
 Street Tactics 
 
 In both LA and NYC, Terry stops were the hallmark of the policing 
regimes in the past decade.  Street stops of pedestrians under Terry v Ohio (1968) 
permit officers to engage, question, then possibly frisk suspects for weapons 
based on reasonable suspicions that “crime is afoot.”  Officers can search a 
suspect based on probable cause that the suspect is either armed or has contraband 
in his possession or has committed a crime (Terry v Ohio, 1968). In NYC, with its 
high volume of pedestrian traffic, most stops have been street stops.  In LA, with 
a lower population density and far greater use of automobiles, stops are a 
combination of street stops and motor vehicle stops.  The stops, whether in a car 
or on the street, are invasive, often unpleasant, and usually did not result in an 
arrest.  The racial disproportionality of street stops and car stops were, in each 
city, a driver of litigation. 
 
 Table 1 shows data on Terry stops in each city for two years in the past 
decade.  At first glance, it seems that “street” policing in New York in the past 
decade not only has grown substantially, but the number of involuntary police-
citizen contacts rose by nearly 500% within five years.  The years in Table 1 were 
chosen for ease of comparison based on available data.  In the four years from 
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2008-2011, the rate of involuntary citizen stops in New York rose to 686,724, an 
increase of 45.5% from 2007.  The rate in Los Angeles rose by 100%, a far lower 
increase.  But the LAPD made a total of 875,204 stops including vehicle stops, so 
the focus on pedestrian stops vastly understates the extent of LAPD citizen 
interdictions.  Traffic stops in New York are far less frequent. The percent Black 
or Hispanic in New York was 86.6% in 2011, a rate that has been rising slowly 
since the first analysis of these data in 1998 (New York State Attorney General, 
1999).   
 
Blacks and Hispanics in both cities remain the primary recipients of 
proactive police actions and attention.  Data on pedestrian stops in both cities for 
years 2002 and 2007 presented in Table 1 show that the majority of stops in each 
place are of Hispanic and Black suspects.  Although the LAPD has been subject 
to less scrutiny than NYPD on disparities in police stops, the stop proportions by 
race in both cities are quite similar.  Ayres and Borowsky (2008) showed stark 
racial disparities in Los Angeles in 2004, after controlling for crime rates.  Fagan 
et al. (2010) showed the same in New York for 2006.   
 
Our data in Table 1 most likely understate race- or ethnic-specific 
disparities.  We combine Black and Hispanics, but one should recognize this 
masks the stark disparity borne for Blacks in LA (Ayers and Borowsky, 
2008).  Over time, Blacks have been a far smaller percentage of the LA 
population (9.6 % in 2010) than are Blacks in New York (25.5% in 2010). 
Conversely, the Latino population in LA is a far greater share of the City’s 
population (48.5% in 2010) compared to New York (28.6% in 2010).  A separate 
analysis of stops per capita by race would show a far higher rate of pedestrian 
stops for Blacks in LA, comparable to NYC’s rate. 
 
 
Table 1.  Pedestrian Stops per 100,000 Persons, New York and Los Angeles, 
2002 and 2007 
  
New York 
 
Los Angeles 
  
2002 2007 
 
2002 2007 
Total 
 
9,7830 472,096 
 
76,615 135,263 
Rate per 100,000 1,210.1 5,705.4 
 
2,010.8 3,384.9 
% Black or Hispanic 73.4 81.7   78.5 81.0 
Source:   
	   	   	   	   	   	   
  
The higher per capita stop rates in NYC may reflect more than simply 
tactics, but the size of human resources devoted to stopping citizens.  The number 
of officers in uniform at the NYPD was 34,060 is June 2012, the lowest total 
since the 34,825 officers on the force in 1992, when crime rates began their 
decline.  The LAPD has 9,927 officers from 2009- 2012, (LAPD SRGE Report, 
2012).  So, the disparity in personnel – a ratio of 3.5|1 – between the two cities 
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doesn’t explain the 1.7|1disparity in per capita stop rates.  Just considering the rate 
of pedestrian stops, LAPD officers appear to be very active, relative to the size of 
the force.  When we include motor vehicle stops, the LAPD appears to be 
stopping a lot of citizens relative to the size of its police force. 
 
Pedestrian or “street” stops are hardly the only policing story in each city.  
The totality of policing over the past decade in each place has been substantial.  
Several specific enforcement priorities, consistent with its Order Maintenance 
Policing strategy, have produced significant numbers of arrests for several types 
of low-level misdemeanors and violations.  The NYPD have averaged over 
45,000 marijuana possession arrests since 2000 (Geller and Fagan, 2010) and an 
additional 16,000 criminal trespass arrests each year since 2007.  More than one 
in three of those arrests were resolved in favor of the defendant (NYCLU, 2012). 
In 2011, prosecutors declined to charge more than 13 percent of people arrested 
for trespassing in the city.   NYPD officers also issue numerous citations for a 
variety of “quality of life” violations that are not criminal offenses, but that carry 
criminal liability if the citation is not answered.  Comparable data in LA are 
difficult to obtain, though the combination of pedestrian and motor vehicle stops 
suggests a rate of involuntary contact with police – whether through stops or 
citation of other enforcement initiatives – that is comparable to that in New York.  
 
The move over the past decade to a policing regime in each city that 
emphasizes proactive contacts with citizens whether at the moment of an offense 
or before it occurs has produced a thick net of social control that envelopes each 
city’s minority neighborhoods.  For adolescents and young adults, the frequent 
police contacts have become a part of the normal process of adolescent 
development, a form of anticipatory socialization that internalizes the stigma of 
police contact, whether founded or not by the detection of crime.  If the contacts 
themselves are harsh and unpleasant, the negative aftermath generates not just ill 
will, but a withdrawal of citizens from cooperation with the police (Tyler, 1990).  
In an era of steeply declining crime rates in each city, the theoretical and 
empirical basis for the escalation of police contact may be questionable and strain 
public confidence in the police, especially among minorities most likely to 
experience police contact. 
 
 
The Political Economy of Policing and Crime  
 
The shared temporal shifts in patterns of bellwether crimes in Los Angeles 
and New York over 50 years are remarkable given the distinct political 
trajectories and institutional structures of policing in each city over this time.  One 
might assume that, given the influence of William Bratton as the commissioner of 
the NYPD and later chief of the LAPD, a remarkable figure in policing in each 
city and within the profession, the developmental teleology of policing would be 
similar.  But it isn’t.  The forces that shape policing are a combination of both the 
unique social and demographic circumstances of the two cities, but also their 
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responses institutionally and politically to parallel pressures of crime, scandal, and 
reform.  And here, the two cities had – as with policing – both shared and distinct 
changes over time in their social structure.  The two cities were each undergoing 
rapid and profound transformations, not just since the peak of the crime decline, 
but for many years before.  The twin patterns of ecological change and the 
teleology of policing and crime raise important questions about the ordering of 
these influences in the broader transformation of the city. 
 
 
Housing and Gentrification 
 
 The physical space of each city has transformed dramatically in the past 
two decades. Gentrification in the central core of each city, as well as in selected 
neighborhoods, has both displaced populations from poor, high crime areas and 
reconfigured the built environment in in those places in dramatic ways.  In each 
city, the process of transforming both the residential and commercial built 
environments has required that the police to engage in more “order maintenance” 
styles of policing in the central business districts.   
 
 New York 
 
 In the midtown business core of New York, between the Theater District 
and office towers to the east, the gentrification of the Times Square area of New 
York was a process designed and implemented in the 1990s. Together with 
zoning changes, tax incentives to spur development helped replace the carnival 
atmosphere of Times Square with retail stores, hotels and restaurants that draw 
from mainstream American culture.27 Physical disorder also was replaced by the 
construction of several office towers housing professional workers.  
 
 As part of the development effort, the shift in policing strategy beginning 
in 1994 to order maintenance facilitated the removal of the signs of social 
disorder.  This meant using zoning laws to force the closing of destinations for 
“undesirables” including pornography shops and cheap eateries.  The aggressive 
policing strategy focused on prostitution, vagrancy and loitering, and other petty 
misdemeanors to remove prostitutes, homeless persons, street card games, and 
groups of persons loitering around X-rated movie houses.  The result was the 
replacement of old visible signs of disorder with businesses and buildings that 
reassured tourists, merchants, and consumers of cultural activities that the area 
was safe.  The local business community encouraged the creation of new forms of 
court services to reduce the recurring nature of much of this crime by providing 
remedial services to those who formerly occupied the streets (Briffault, 1999). 
 
 Although this is an appealing story consistent with “broken windows” 
theories of policing (Kelling and Cole, 1996) and its impact on disorder (Skogan, 
1990), the simultaneous and reciprocal interventions of policing and development 
in the Times Square area makes it difficult to disentangle the causal the effects of 
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policing on crime in a context of radical shifts in the built environment.  In other 
words, the two faces of “broken windows” were remediated simultaneously, with 
perhaps unique, additive or even multiplicative effects.   
 
 Development in the neighborhoods outside the NYC’s business districts 
was based less on commercial development than on the transformation of housing 
and other faces of the built environment.  Much of the development was driven by 
gentrification, but its forms varied by neighborhood.  Gentrification in Harlem, 
Red Hook, Washington Heights, and the South Bronx brought about radical 
transformations in housing and population composition, as well as reductions in 
crime.  Gentrification in Chelsea, largely by gay populations, converted a working 
class residential and rough area into a wealthy enclave.  But the economic and 
cultural dislocations caused by this displacement were dramatic. New businesses 
in those areas were created to serve the new residents, but the jobs they brought 
demanded skills that the remaining local residents did not have, increasing 
economic tensions and intensifying relative deprivation between adjacent areas.  
 
 Police responses in these places, where the crime rate is now low, are no 
different now than they were during the era of dramatic crime reduction in the 
1990s.  Aggressive enforcement of low-level crimes, and aggressive interdiction 
of those who are “out of place,” helped drive more than 500,000 citizen stops 
every year since 2003.  Harlem, a relatively safe neighborhood today, still has a 
very high concentration of police activity, including Terry stops, marijuana 
enforcement, trespass enforcement (Operation Clean Halls), and bans on public 
drinking.  Gentrification inevitably led to the displacement of older residents by 
wealthier (and whiter) newcomers. There is some evidence that those who left 
took crime with them, and have adversely affected the areas to which they have 
dispersed.28 
 
 The relationship between housing and crime in New York is complicated 
not only by real estate booms over the period since the mid-1980s, but by 
strategic investments in housing for poor people.  Since crime in New York, as 
elsewhere, was concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods, we might expect those 
neighborhoods to be the most crime-sensitive to both housing development and 
crime.  Figure 6 shows the distribution of $5.8 billion in housing construction and 
rehabilitation programs for the poor across three mayoralties, starting in 1987, 
under a program known as the “10-Year Plan” (Van Ryzin and Genn, 1999).  Fig 
5 shows that these investments were made in the NYC’s poorest neighborhoods, 
which were those with the highest homicide and other violence rates during the 
peak violence years in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Figure 6: Concentration of Ten-Year Plan Units in New York City, 
1985-1995 
 
 
Source: Greg Van Ryzin and Andrew Genn (1999). 
 
 The decline in crime mirrors these investments.  Figure 7 shows homicide 
“trajectories” for the City’s 275 neighborhoods from 1985-2000 using boundary 
definitions of neighborhoods generated by the Department of City Planning.29  
The trajectories were identified using trajectory modeling methods based on 
Poisson mixture models (Nagin, 2005).  Fagan and Davies (2007) identified four 
crime trajectories that grossly describe crime trends across NYC neighborhoods, 
with 13% comprising the most dangerous and the others showing a more gradual 
decline that began in 1991.  These were not only the most heavily policed places 
in the NYC (Fagan et al., 2010), but they also were the beneficiaries of the Ten-
Year Plan investments.  To illustrate this, Figure 8 shows that homicide declines 
were greatest in the same neighborhoods where housing investments for the poor 
were the highest.   
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Figure 7.  Homicide Trajectories, New York City Neighborhoods, 1985-2000 
 
 
Source: Fagan and Davies, 2007 
 
 
 There are good reasons why people in poor neighborhoods may be more 
responsive to housing investments.  First, housing imparts stakes in one’s 
community (Toby, 1954).  Homeowners are more likely to exercise guardianship 
over their homes and neighborhoods when they have such stakes.  Second, 
housing is a critical pathway to wealth, and an escape route from the poverty traps 
that characterize many poor and high crime neighborhoods (Massey and Denton, 
1993; Sampson and Morenoff, 2006).  Housing ownership reduces transience and 
mobility, in turn promoting the kinds of strong social ties that can inoculate 
neighborhoods against crime through collective social actions (Sampson et al., 
1997).   
 
 Of course, policing throughout this period was concentrated in the areas 
with the highest homicide rates (Letwin, 1990; Karmen, 2000; Fagan et al., 2010).  
Accordingly, the simultaneity of policing and the economic transformation of 
housing complicate efforts to sort out the temporal sequence of changes between 
crime rates shaped directly by the police from those influenced by changes in the 
built environment.  Empirical arguments depend in part on the starting point for 
measuring change, on the lens – whether borough, neighborhood, census tract, or 
police precinct – and how one conceptualizes housing and physical disorder 
(Schwartz et al., 2003; Fagan and Davies, 2007).   
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Figure 8.  Map of Homicide Trajectories by Neighborhood, New York 
City, 1985-2000 
 
Source: Fagan and Davies, 2007 
 
 
 
 Los Angeles 
 
 The same tension in causal mechanisms is evident in the story of housing 
and crime in Los Angeles during the same era.  Was the drop in central LA 
caused by gentrification to downtown neighborhoods and areas new University of 
Southern California?  This is a complex picture because crime rates do not easily 
reconstitute themselves in areas settled by displaced residents.  In fact, when we 
examine the data on Los Angeles it is clear that across all police divisions crime 
rates dropped significantly after 2002 – the period in which Bratton instituted 
COMPSTAT Plus (Gascon, 2005).  Yet, the crime drop in the central business 
district area (Central Police Division) of LA occurred during this period of police 
reform, while crime rates in South LA did not enjoy a similar decline. 
 
In Los Angeles, the redevelopment of neighborhoods like Skid Row in the 
downtown area, and West Hollywood in the outer residential areas, as well as 
recent development of places such as Bunker Hill adjacent to downtown, have 
fueled similar conflicts and tensions over how to appropriately police homeless 
populations when areas become prime targets for real estate investment and urban 
renewal (Blasi, 2007; Harcourt, 2005).  Figure 8 shows the decline in total 
reported violent, property, and nuisance crimes in the Central Police Division of 
LA (where Skid Row is located) between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2007 
(Berk and MacDonald, 2010).  Like New York, there is empirical evidence that 
the LAPD’s efforts through its Safer Cities Initiative to crackdown on 
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misdemeanor crimes and enforce vagrancy laws that ban the formation of large 
homeless encampments led to meaningful reductions in crime (Berk and 
MacDonald, 2010). 
 
Figure 9: Crime Trends in Los Angeles Central Police Division,  
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2007 
 
 
Whether a greater investment in LA county mental health and health and 
human services agencies could have been equally effective as the LAPD’s 
approach to reducing crime and disorder in Skid Row is an open question.  But in 
both cities a focus on crime reduction through getting tough on vagrancy always 
brings out tensions between those concerned with crime control and those 
concerned with the plight of homeless.   
  
We can expect this to continue through the coming decade as 
neighborhoods develop and populations both change and older residents are 
dislocated.  Gentrification will always bring about tensions for police as 
community expectations about the police response change in response to changing 
dynamics of neighborhood property owners and residents.  
 
Immigration 
 
The second major transformation of the city during the second half of the 
20th century – and into the first decade of this century – has been the increase in 
both size and neighborhood concentration of immigrants. The relationship 
between immigration and crime has been a topic of policy interest at different 
times in 20th century, and the current era is no different.  The 1931 report by the 
National Committee on Law Observation and Enforcement, popularly called the 
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Wickersham Commission, observed no evidence linking immigration to increased 
crime patterns (Tonry, 1997).  
 
Despite the Wickersham Commission’s observations, sociology was 
dominated by the thinking that immigration was linked to crime through 
neighborhood social disadvantage.  Sociologists studied immigration as a central 
feature of the social structure of neighborhoods in the first half of the 20th century. 
Most concluded that immigrants themselves had relatively low rates of criminal 
offending, but that immigrants settled into disadvantaged areas that exposed their 
children to higher rates of offending.  Several notable sociologists theorized that 
any evidence of higher crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods was a result of the 
exposure of second generation immigrants to economic disadvantage, a culture of 
conflict, and underclass norms that were more favorable to violations of the law in 
the presence of relative economic disadvantage (see Reckless and Smith 1932; 
Sutherland 1934; Sellin 1938; Shaw and McKay 1942).    
 
But recent empirical research on the immigration-crime nexus suggests 
that the earlier links between immigrant settlements and neighborhood crime rates 
have changed, suggesting a new and different interpretation of the social 
disorganization theories of the first generation of immigration-crime studies (cf. 
Morenoff and Astor 2006; Martinez, Stowell, and Lee 2010).  During the 1990s, a 
number of U.S. cities, including both New York and Los Angeles, experienced 
substantial growth of immigrant settlement into inner-city poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods (Malone et al. 2003; Passel and Suro 2005; Davies and Fagan, 
2012).  Neighborhood patterns of poverty and residential segregation in New 
York and Los Angeles, like many other large cities, shifted the demographic 
makeup of high poverty neighborhoods that had since the 1960s been the areas of 
standing racial or ethnic disparities in income and housing segregation (Cutler, 
Glaeser, and Vigdor 2008; Glaeser, 2011).  The New York neighborhoods of 
Harlem and the South Bronx that had been settled by African Americans and 
Puerto Ricans for decades became areas of concentrated poverty that were 
emblematic with crime in the city (Davies and Fagan, 2012).  In the Los Angeles 
neighborhoods of East Los Angeles, South Central, and Watts, African Americans 
and Mexican Americans had been living in entrenched poverty since the 1960s.  
These neighborhoods were considered hot beds of crime and violence; Watts, as 
we mentioned earlier, was the center of an apocryphal riot in 1965.   
 
For reasons owing perhaps to both economics and race or ethnicity, these 
areas of entrenched poverty became destinations for new immigrants.  Immigrants 
tended to settle in places they could afford and places where people looked like 
them (Davies and Fagan, 2012).   In Los Angeles, this meant that areas of both 
Mexican American and African American poverty became increasingly 
concentrated with foreign born residents.  In New York, the neighborhood of 
Washington Heights became a reception zone for immigrants from the Dominican 
Republic in the 1970s, while American residents of Puerto Rico in-migrated to the 
neighborhoods of the South Bronx and East Harlem in the 1960s.  Haitian and 
36	  	  
other Caribbean immigrants settled in the East Flatbush area of Brooklyn in the 
1970s, accelerating an outmigration of whites to the suburbs that began two 
decades earlier.    
 
These were neighborhoods with high crime and violence for decades, but 
as we show for each city, that is no longer the case.  As crime rates declined in 
each city, we show that the decline in crime in the new immigrant neighborhoods 
was greater than in other parts of the respective cities.  There is evidence both in 
New York and Los Angeles that neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
immigrants have experienced larger crime declines than similarly situated 
neighborhoods without heavy influxes of immigrants.  As with housing, the worst 
places in each city became safer, and the evidence suggests that this marginal gain 
in public safety was attributable to immigrants. 
 
Los Angeles 
 
 Figure 10 shows the distribution of foreign born residents and Latinos 
(predominately Mexican American) in LA census tracts in 1990 and 2000.  What 
is striking from this figure is how more concentrated immigrant enclaves became 
in LA, even in areas previously not considered immigrant enclaves.   
 
 
Figure 10:  Distribution of Foreign Born and Latinos In Los Angeles 
Neighborhoods (1990-2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: MacDonald, Hipp, and Gill 2012 
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MacDonald and colleagues (MacDonald, Hipp, and Gill, 2012) showed 
that these areas with high expected probabilities of immigrant settlement30 had 
greater reductions in crime between 2000 and 2005 than other similarly situated 
areas.31  Figure 11 shows the average change in neighborhood crime rates as 
measured by the total number of serious crimes32 declined substantially more in 
neighborhoods with higher expected immigrant settlement patterns. What these 
findings suggest is that part of the crime decline in LA is a story of immigrant 
concentration.   But there are several immigration stories in Los Angeles, owing 
to the multiple countries of origins of various immigrant groups, especially from 
Central and South America.  Identifying unique sending-country effects is 
complicated by the absence of country of origin measures prior to the 2000 
census.  Even with those data, parsing the unique country-of-origin effects would 
be complicated by the high percentage of Mexican immigration and the 
residential integration of all immigrant groups in neighborhoods where Spanish is 
the first language.   
 
 
 
Source: MacDonald, Hipp, and Gill 2012 
 
  
 New York 
 
 In New York, immigration rose steadily beginning in the 1970s, with 
settlements of Caribbeans in East Flatbush and Dominicans in Washington 
Heights.  Two decades before, Puerto Ricans in-migrated to NYC and settled 
primarily in East Harlem and the South Bronx, spreading out from there to other 
neighborhood across the City. Figure 12 show maps of immigrant concentration 
in 1990 and again in 2000.  Immigration since 1990, primarily South Asians, 
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Mexicans and other Central Americans, and several East Asian groups, has been 
concentrated in several neighborhoods in Queens and Brooklyn, with smaller 
concentrations in Manhattan and the Bronx.   
 
Figure 12:  Distribution of Foreign Born Population in New York Neighborhoods 
(1990-2000) 
 
 As in Los Angeles, immigration has been a protective factor in the natural 
history of crime in the city’s neighborhoods.  Figure 13 shows the effects of 
immigrant concentration on specific types of crime in New York during the same 
period as reported by Davies and Fagan (2012).  To assess potential cohort 
effects, immigrant neighborhoods were measured both as the percentage of all 
foreign born residents and then as the percentage of foreign born residents who 
had lived there for less than five years.  In each case, there were strong significant 
effects for the total immigrant population on all crimes, plus three specific crime 
types.  But the effects were less muted for recent immigrants, owing perhaps to 
the fact that by 1997, they had arrived in neighborhoods that already had 
experienced strong crime declines, and that realized significant improvements in 
housing (Fagan and Davies, 2007).   
 
!
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Source: Davies and Fagan, 2012 
 
 
 Davies and Fagan (2012) also showed differences by ethnicity and race in 
the effects of immigrant concentration on neighborhood crime.  Figure 14 shows 
the effects of immigrant concentration on both total and violent crime were 
greatest in neighborhoods where White (mainly Russian and other Eastern 
Europeans) and Black (mainly Caribbean) immigrants settled. Concentrations of 
Latino immigrants showed little effect on crime rates, perhaps for different 
reasons.  One was the generally lower concentration of Latino immigrants and 
their entry into a heterogeneous set of neighborhoods, with both low and high 
crime rates.  Asian immigrants tended to settle in stable low crime areas, muting 
any effects of either longstanding or more recent immigrants.  
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Figure 13.  Effects of Immigrant Concentration on 
Crime by Type of Crime (Z-score), New York City 
Census Tracts, 1990-2002 
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Source: Davies and Fagan, 2012 
 
 
 In both cities, generational effects are evident, though they seem to work 
on opposing directions.  In New York, neighborhoods with newer immigrants had 
smaller crime declines than the more settled immigrant areas.  While this may be 
an effect specific to the ethnic group, it may also suggest that the effects of 
immigrant generation covary with pre-existing crime and other social conditions 
in the neighborhoods. 
 
 But the story is somewhat different in Los Angeles.  In areas settled by 
more recent Central American immigrants have had lower crime rates through the 
late 1990s than areas settled several generations ago by Mexican immigrants 
(MacDonald et al., 2012).  Boyle Heights, for example, had a lower rate of crime 
drop than Southeast Los Angeles, where newer generations of immigrants had 
arrived since 1990.  Though both areas had similar percentages of Hispanic 
residents, Southeast Los Angeles became an area of greater immigrant 
concentration over the decade of the 1990s.  These trends suggest that 
acculturation by the second generation accompanied by poverty trapped 
neighborhoods reduces any generational effect of immigration on reducing crime 
(MacDonald et al., 2012).  In short, by the third generation the rates of crime 
climb back to what would be expected if a neighborhood had concentrated 
poverty and few immigrants.   
 
This suggests that the benefits of immigrant concentration on reducing 
crime may be transitory, and if not accompanied by social mobility to diffuse and 
assimilate into the city (and regional) social structure and economy.  In other 
words, racial and ethnic segregation might erode the gains in crime reduction and 
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Figure 14.  Effects of Immigrant Concentration on 
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social control that are produced by new immigrants.  In the first generation, 
segmented assimilation of self-selected immigrants into new ethnic enclaves may 
produce social capital benefits that help control crime and even provide some 
protection for second generation residents during adolescence (MacDonald et al., 
2012).  But, as time goes by, neighborhoods entrenched in poverty regardless of 
the historical ethnic heritage will have crime rates that return to normal states. The 
South Central and Southeast neighborhoods of LA are central to this story of 
crime decline in the LA but also the immigration story.  The crime declines in 
these places were strongly correlated with the arrival of new immigrant residents.  
So, while Los Angeles as a whole was growing safer between 1994 and 2005, the 
dominant trend was in the areas that were undergoing significant immigrant 
arrival and gentrification.   
   
 
Policing Immigration and Crime 
 
One might expect that the potential benefit of immigration for reducing 
crime rates in neighborhoods has not been lost on the police and public officials in 
either city.  But on this question, the two cities differ.  In Los Angeles, for 
example, former police chief Daryl Gates help establish an LAPD departmental 
policy in 1979 to not initiate “police action with the objective of discovering the 
alien status of a person,” and to not arrest or book a person for “illegal entry” into 
the United States (Rampart Independent Review Panel 2001).  The LAPD have 
been vigilant about not enforcing federal immigration laws so that they can 
encourage immigrants to actively report crimes.  
 
How do police patrol these neighborhoods, and what is the nature of 
police-citizen interactions?  Crime and arrests are endogenous, so it is difficult to 
sort out whether the lower crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods are an 
externality of immigration, or whether the police alter their strategies in areas that 
they may believe to be different and (more important) less problematic.  While 
there is no direct data on police patrol strength in LA and immigrant enclaves, it is 
noteworthy that the LAPD has had a friendly immigrant policy on the books since 
1979.   
 
 In NYC, there is no specific policy on policing immigrant neighborhoods.  
But there is evidence that police in NYC more aggressively patrol neighborhoods 
with poor and African American populations, after controlling for crime, but they 
are less aggressive in areas settled by immigrants from Latin America generally.   
Figure 15 shows that enforcement for total, violent, and property crimes is 
significantly higher in places with greater proportions of immigrants, after 
controlling for any differences in crime. Only for drug crimes does there appear to 
be less enforcement in immigrant neighborhoods.  And enforcement here, defined 
as the sum of Terry stops (stops and frisks) plus misdemeanor arrests, is greater in 
neighborhoods with higher concentrations of recent immigrants. This effect is 
especially strong for newer immigrants who have been in country for less than 
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five years. Although crime is on balance lower in neighborhoods with higher 
immigrant concentrations, the ratio of stops and arrests to crime is higher in these 
same places.  
 
 
Source: Davies and Fagan, 2012 
 
These enforcement patterns vary by the race and ethnicity of the 
immigrant group, especially for immigrants of African descent.  Figure 16 shows 
that enforcement, controlling for crime, is slightly higher for recent immigrants of 
Latino origin, but lower for both Whites (again, primarily Eastern Europeans) and 
significantly lower for immigrants of African descent.  Evidently, while African 
immigration protects neighborhoods from crime, it also protects them from the 
excesses of racially-tinged enforcement that characterizes the NYC 
neighborhoods where native born African Americans reside (Fagan and Davies, 
2000; Fagan et al., 2010). 
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Figure 15.  Effects of Immigrant Concentration on 
Enforcement by Type of Crime (Z-score), New York City 
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Source: Davies and Fagan, 2012 
 
 
Immigration in LA and NYC will continue, contingent on national 
political considerations, throughout the coming decade but at a pace that may not 
equal what we saw in the past decade.  And as second and third generation 
immigrants occupy the neighborhoods where their parents landed, their 
immersion into the (nonwhite) American culture suggests the possibility that 
crime problems will emerge.  How the intergenerational path from immigration to 
crime patterns emerges in each city is difficult to predict.  
  
The interaction of immigration and gentrification also is a cautionary 
story.  Tensions and conflicts between African American and Latino groups in 
LA, and also in Northern Manhattan, suggest the possibility of a return to the 
social dynamics of a century ago in Chicago, where immigrant groups clashed, 
organized into gangs, and crime and conflict were prevalent.  Finally, the role of 
police in enforcing immigration laws is complex and changing.  Most police 
agencies see this as outside of their mission and jurisdiction, and they also see it 
as dissuading citizens from voluntary cooperation with police in investigating 
everyday crimes.  
 
Sampson (2008) suggests that there is a link between rising immigration 
patterns in cities and the declines in crime rates that occurred during the 1990s.   
More recent work by Stowell et al. (2009) and Martinez et al. (2010) suggests 
these trends are true across cities and within San Diego.  Our review of the data 
suggests a similar pattern in LA and NYC.  While immigrant settlement has not 
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Figure 16.  Effects of Immigrant Concentration on 
Enforcement by Ethnicity (Z-score), New York City 
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played a central role in explanations of neighborhood patterns of crime or, more 
generally, our research in both cities suggests a link between within-neighborhood 
changes in crime and predicted immigrant settlement patterns, net the effects of 
population and housing characteristics traditionally correlated with crime.  
Immigrant settlement patterns are associated with appreciable reductions in the 
crime in neighborhoods in both cities.  
 
 
The Future 
  
For a half century, policing in the two cities has gone through a cycle of 
crime booms and more recent busts that have oscillated around periods of scandal 
and reform.  Crime has declined for nine consecutive years in Los Angeles, 
including a 9.6% decline in 2010.  While crime has also declined throughout the 
past decade in New York, the pace of change has been slower in the than during 
the first decade of the unprecedented decline that started around 1992.  Los 
Angeles is slowly catching up to the low crime rates that now characterize New 
York.  The connection between the two phenomena is part of a larger and more 
complex evolution in each city: the trends in crime and the episodes of policing 
scandal and reform have also coincided with changes in the social fabric of New 
York and Los Angeles.  
     
The past decade has been a time of battles with civil litigation in Los 
Angeles and New York over accusations of unconstitutional police practices.  In 
2009, Los Angeles emerged from nine years under a consent decree – just one 
year short of the expiration of the second five-year term. In lifting the consent 
decree the U.S. District Court Judge Gary A. Fees overseeing the decree noted 
“LAPD has become the national and international policing standard for activities 
that range from audits to handling of the mentally ill to many aspects of training 
to risk assessment of police officers and more.”33  The LAPD has entered into 
new partnerships with various community organizations (Nagourney, 2011), and 
nearly 80% of LA residents expressed strong approval for the performance of the 
department.  This approval included 76% and 68% of the Black and Latino 
respondents to the poll.  These signs show that the LAPD has recovered, both in 
reputation and in performance, following what was perhaps the biggest police 
corruption scandal in the U.S.  
 
While Los Angeles has emerged from civil rights litigation in 2009 
following a lengthy period of intensive federal court monitoring, New York City 
emerged from the Daniels litigation in 2007 only to become immediately mired in 
three new separate lawsuits alleging both racial discrimination and a pattern of 
unconstitutional street stops.  The NYPD has intensified its spectrum of Order 
Maintenance Policing tactics, including trespass enforcement in public housing, 
street stops, and misdemeanor marijuana enforcement.  All three prongs of this 
strategy have led to litigation and their wisdom and benefits continue to be hotly 
contested.  The divided response of the NYC’s diverse communities to the Stop 
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and Frisk program, the centerpiece of the NYPD strategy, shows the depth of the 
racial breach between citizens and police: White	  voters	  approve	  59	  –	  36	  percent,	  while	  disapproval	  is	  68	  –	  27	  percent	  among	  Black	  voters	  and	  52	  –	  43	  percent	  among	  Hispanic	  voters.	  	   
 
In LA, the future of the LAPD and its ties to the diverse communities of 
the city was set in motion by the changes brought about through both the external 
pressures of the litigation and the internal push for reform and responsiveness by 
Chief Bratton.  The LAPD has become more diverse in the past decade, including 
a plurality of minority officers, a compositional change that has been linked to the 
positive response by the diverse communities of Los Angeles.  There has been an 
active effort in the LAPD to diversify its department and finds was to enhance its 
recruiting effort, including using a new recruiting system developed by 
researchers at the RAND Corporation (Lim et al., 2009). 
 
Like New York, racial disparities in police contacts remained through 
2004, even after controlling for differences in crime rates between locations 
(Ayres and Borowsky, 2008; Fagan et al., 2010).  Still, the structural and cultural 
reforms in the LAPD suggest that LA has entered a new era marked by 
collaboration between the LAPD and the community, built on a platform of 
accountability, transparency, and positive performance in maintaining safety and 
order.  What is perhaps most important for the future are the signs of the 
community investment in this collaboration (Nagourney, 2011).Whether this 
future will hold, and for how long, is uncertain.  But it is notable that there has not 
been a similar period on the past 50 years where the LAPD was viewed in such a 
favorable light by a wide cross section of racial and ethnic minorities in the city. 
  
The future in New York is not quite as bright.  High profile scandals 
continue surrounding the policing of racial and ethnic minorities, including the 
surveillance of Muslim communities both within the City and the surrounding 
region (Associated Press, 2011), allegations of falsification of victim reports to 
suppress crime statistics (Rayman, 2011; Eterno and Silverman, 2012), monetary 
damage settlements of more than $57 million per year over the past decade in 
police misconduct litigation (Hennelley, 2010), allegations of arrest and “stop” 
quotas and illegal arrests (Powell, 2012), extensive targeted surveillance of 
Muslim groups in madrassas and mosques both inside the City and in neighboring 
cities (Associated Press, 2012), constitutional violations in the handling of 
political demonstrations in 2004 and in the current Occupy Wall Street 
movement, and chronic conflicts with the press over reporting of crime and 
political demonstrations.  Even as crime rates decline in a period where the NYPD 
force has shrunk by over 6,000 officers (Zimring, 2011), the tension between 
ethnic minorities and the NYPD remains front-and-center.  
  
While the LAPD has emerged from a period of crisis and deep 
institutional reform to build an umbrella of legitimacy through close ties to the 
varied communities of LA, the current posture of the NYPD and the resistance to 
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outside monitoring and internal reforms suggests a less clear future.  The LAPD 
has harmonized, to the extent possible given its recent past, with the future of the 
social fabric of LA.  The same cannot be said in NYC.  Many citizens in NYC, 
including those most heavily policed, await the next mayor and police 
commissioner to see whether a new era of reform can begin that includes citizen 
trust and satisfaction as an outcome equally worthy of addressing as the crime 
rate. 
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Notes 	  
1 The New York Post, as only the New York Post can, published a front page headline on 
September 7, 1990 that screamed “Crime-ravaged city cries out for help: Dave, Do 
Something.”  The headline was aimed at Mayor David Dinkins, demanding that he take 
strong measures to stop crime after a particularly gruesome few days of lethal violence in 
New York City.  Dinkins did just that, collaborating with then-Speaker Peter Vallone of 
the New York City Council to pass the Safe Streets, Safe Cities Act in the state 
legislature, funding 5,000 new police officers who were deployed a year later in 1991. By 
1992, crime had begun to fall, dropping 10 percent in two years (Fagan, Zimring and 
Kim, 1998; Karmen, 2000; Zimring, 2011).  Crime has continued to fall for the next 20 
years. 
2 Litigation in New York was filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights in 2001, 
following an investigation of the NYPD Stop and Frisk tactics by the New York State 
Attorney General (Spitzer, 1999).  The 2001 litigation resulted in a Stipulated Settlement 
in Kelvin Daniels et al. v City of New York et al, 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS).  Subsequent 
litigation was filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights in January 2008 following the 
expiration of the Daniels settlement. The current case, David Floyd et al. v. City of New 
York et al. 08 Civ 1034 (SAS), will proceed to trial later this year.  In Los Angeles, the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil suit alleging that the Department 
was engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrests and unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  The litigation produced a Consent Decree in United States of 
America v. City of Los Angeles et al.,that was signed in 2001.  
3 David Garland points out in Culture of Control (2001) that two entire generations of 
Americans and Britains have knowledge only of insecurity, and either lack knowledge of 
or can’t remember low crime eras.  This tends to make criminology a distinctly 
ahistorical discipline.   Most active criminologists were born after 1960 and received their 
advanced degrees after 1980.  As a cohort, they have no memory of low crime eras or the 
theory and discourse on crime in the lower crime eras that predate the Presidents 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (1967) or the Kerner 
Commission Report (1968).  There also are some difficulties in accessing reliable data on 
those eras.  Current theory on crime is framed by the limitations of our data sources, 
which too often began after 1975 for crime victimization or 1968 for homicide.  
4 For illustrations of this Foucaultian idea, see David Garland (2001). See, also, Timothy 
Garton Ash (ed.) (1999). 
5 During the riot, the incomparable baseball pitcher Sandy Koufax pitched a no-hitter for 
the team, the Dodgers, in a game that was witnessed by fewer than one fifth of those who 
had bought tickets. 
6 http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1110 
7 Chief Parker died within a year of the Watts riots.  He was replaced in by Ed Davis, 
who instituted several reforms that sought closer ties to the minority community.  One 
innovation was the Basic Car Plan, which assigned officers to specific geographic 
boundaries, an early version of local - if not community - policing.  Davis also increased 
the number of specialized units (Encyclopedia of Police Science).  Aside from these 
marginal changes though, the LAPD remained focused on police efficiency and 
administration while rebuilding community relations damaged by the riots (Greene, 
2007).  Daryl Gates succeeded Parker in 1978, an internal hire. He focused primarily on 
budget-driven reductions in hiring during massive population growth, the emergence of 	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dense networks of street gangs, and the first of two waves of rising crime rates. Gates 
served as LAPD chief of police until he retired under pressure in 1992 after the riots set 
off by the Rodney King incident. 
8 King had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated and was currently 
driving under a suspended license.  He led the LAPD on a high speed chase for 
approximately 10 minutes.  In total 12 cars were involved in the pursuit.  Upon exiting 
the car King allegedly refused to lie down, was shot with a Taser and then was repeatedly 
hit with batons and kicked while on the ground (Christopher Commission, 1991).  This 
may have been a routine police-citizen use of force case had it not been captured on 
videotape from a nearby resident. 
9 A poll taken by the LA Times newspaper shortly after the incident found that 87% of 
African-American and 80% of Hispanic respondents thought that police brutality in the 
LAPD was common (Christopher Commission, 1991; p. 16).  Tuch and Wetizer's (1997) 
examination of LA Times public opinion poll data over periods before and after highly 
publicized incidents of police brutality (e.g., January 3, 1979 shooting of Eulia Love; 
March 3, 1991 beating of Rodney King) found dramatic reductions in public approval of 
the LAPD among African American and Hispanic respondents.  Studies in other cities 
also show that high-profile media cases of police abuse increase minority distrust of the 
police (Jefferies et al. 1997; Weitzer 2002).  The trends of declining opinion appear to 
last in LA until 1995 (Tuch and Weitzer, 1997), years after the LAPD had instituted its 
first series of reforms. 
10 Williams’ five year term effectively removed the life tenure status of the police chief 
and made the LAPD executive more accountable to the political constituents.   Williams 
was known for his ability form tight bonds with the public in Philadelphia the wake of the 
reforms that occurred to rebuild citizen trust Philadelphia police under the Rizzo 
administration were involved in numerous high-profile use of deadly force events.  
However, Williams experience in the LAPD was short-lived, as his powers as a chief 
were circumscribed in many ways, including limiting his ability to bring in outside 
command staff. The LAPD did, however, under Chief William’s direction form a 
strategic plan for change that fully embraced the goals of community policing as well as 
the mission. 
11 See http://www.lapdonline.org/search_results/content_basic_view/6528 
12 Tbe BOI noted numerous problems recruitment screening and supervision of CRASH 
officers in the field, and downplayed wider problems of routine illegality by CRASH 
officers.  
13 See timeline provided by PBS documentary film: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/bare.html.   
14 For example, the Knapp Report identified two particular classes of corrupt police 
officer, which it called "Grass Eaters" and "Meat Eaters." Each was endemic to the 
culture of the department, and the sustaining norms were passed on from the older 
generations of police to the new recruits. The classification itself refers to petty 
corruption under peer pressure ("eating grass") and aggressive premeditated major 
corruption ("eating meat").  "Grass Eaters" were police officers who routinely took five, 
ten, twenty dollar payments from contractors, tow-truck operators, gamblers, and others 
working both inside and outside the law.  “Grass eating” was a way of life for many cops, 
normalized in the police culture, and was considered part of the “pay” for being a cop. 
The Knapp Commission found that “grass eating” was used by police officers to prove 	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their loyalty to the “brotherhood” of cops, and was essential to sustaining the police 
culture.  "Meat Eaters" were officers who "spend a good deal of time aggressively 
looking for larger paydays,” such as shaking down pimps and drug dealers for money. 
The Commission noted that these officers justified this extortion by marginalizing their 
victims were criminals and underserving of police protection.  
15 The Mollen Commission heard from officers who admitted pouring ammonia on the 
face of a detainee in a holding cell and from another who threw garbage and boiling 
water on someone hiding in a dumbwaiter shaft. Another officer allegedly doctored an 
"escape rope" used by drug dealers so they would plunge to the ground if they used it, 
and the same group also raided a brothel while in uniform, ordered the customers to 
leave, and terrorized and raped the women there 
16 CNN News (1999.) "30-year sentence for N.Y. policeman in torture of black man". 
CNN.com. Retrieved May 25, 2012. 
17 See background at: 
http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1120 
18http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&article_i
d=593&issue_id=52005 
19 http://www.lapdonline.org/lapd_command_staff/comm_bio_view/7579 
20 http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/18/local/me-consent-decree18 
21 See, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/stop_and_frisk/index.html 
22 One of us (Fagan) was a consultant to the New York State Attorney General and 
assisted in the analysis that was published in the Spitzer (1999) report on racial disparities 
and Fourth Amendment concerns in the NYPD Stop and Frisk Program. This review 
focuses on the larger social and political contexts of policing in New York before and 
after that era. 
23 See, Ligon et al v. City of New York for a description of how Operation Clean Halls 
operates.  According to data provided by the City of New York in the Davis litigation, 
police conduct approximately 25,000 “vertical patrols” each month where they patrol the 
halls and stairwells of these buildings as well as buildings in New York City Housing 
Authority developments. 
24 To control for the potential under reporting of robberies over time we adjust robbery 
rates by subtracting the ratio of robberies to homicides in each year.  This in effect 
reduces the influence that changes in the reporting of robbery will have on the robbery 
rate.  A big ratio will result in down-weighting the rate or robberies.  The results we 
display with or without this adjustment have no material effect. 
25 Adjusting robbery rates for changes in reporting practices relative to homicide doesn’t 
change  the story of the 1990s.  
26 The statistical analysis was not the only component of Bratton’s reforms.  He 
developed new models of accountability for field commanders, also instituted new tactics 
including aggressive street stops as part of his response in crime “hot spots.”  See, for 
example, Maple and Mitchell, 2000; Dickey (2009).	  
27 Chain stores (e.g., Gap, Levi Straus, Disney, Toys ‘R Us), hotels (e.g., Marriott, W,  
Hilton, Crowne Plaza), and entertainment (e.g., ESPN Zone, MTV), all with nationwide 
identity, proliferate in Times Square today.  	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28 Incarceration rates in the upstate counties contiguous to New York City have risen 
sharply since 2000, in part because of the social shock to quiet and homogenously white 
upstate areas of newly transplanted former City residents.  See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, As 
Gangs Move to Upstate New York, So Too Does Crime, National Public Radio, Morning 
Edition, March 14, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/2012/03/14/148160372/as-
gangs-move-to-new-york-suburbs-so-does-crime 
29  Boundary maps for these neighborhoods of approximately 15,000 population are 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/meta_nynta.shtml 
30  Measured by a standardized value of percentage of foreign born residents and 
percentage of Hispanic/Latino residents 
31 Immigrant enclaves were matched with other neighborhoods based on local poverty 
index, a measure of residential stability, the number of males under age 25, and the 
regional patterns of immigration in Los Angeles. 
32 FBI index offenses, which include murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, theft-
person, theft-vehicle, kidnap, arson of a dwelling, and motor vehicle theft 
33 See, Joel Rubin, U.S. Judge Ends Federal Oversight Of The LAPD, Los Angeles 
Times, July 18, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/18/local/me-
consent-decree18 
